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The use of aviation in wildfire management is essential to combating a growing hazard 
across the United States, but the modern organizational framework employed by the 
federal government is faulty. Chief among the problems is the contract-based approach; 
with rampant inefficiencies, unsafe practices, and stagnant culture that resists innovation, 
the contracted structure has wasted billions of dollars and cost firefighters their lives. 
This study looks at three options to take over the aviation wildfire responsibilities—the 
active duty military, the National Guard, and a new DHS agency—in terms of the legal, 
societal, fiscal, and organizational implications of each alternative. The active duty option 
would sacrifice traditional military readiness for a wildfire mission; the new DHS agency 
would require far too great an expense in political capital and funding to get started, in 
the absence of a focusing event. The National Guard option offers the most practical and 
acceptable solution for politicians and the public to provide an improved aviation service. 
With unique flexibility to operate under state or federal control, the National Guard 
would bring professional military capabilities to their existing role in wildfire 
management. 
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In 2009, the Station Fire in southern California burned 160,000 acres, killed two 
firefighters, endangered vital infrastructure, and threatened thousands of homes and 
millions of lives.1 It nearly torched the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory and vital 
electrical infrastructure for all of Los Angeles County in the months that it burned.The 
Station Fire ranks “among the most costly fires in the nation’s history.”2 The toll owes 
much to the way the blaze was—and was not—attacked, especially early in its 
development.  
Experts question, among other things, “whether sufficient aviation assets were 
available to respond … and whether the response was indicative of a broader need for 
more or different assets to respond.”3 Key here was the underuse (or unavailability) of 
suitable aircraft and crews, particularly for the rugged, inaccessible terrain over which the 
Station Fire raged. The fact was the fire authorities in the Station Fire had few options 
and less capacity to bring aircraft to bear in their effort because such assets are procured 
on a contract basis; no agency owns or operates sufficient or dedicated wildfire aviation 
assets. The experience of the Station Fire, among others, made clear that the existing 
contract-based system and its pervasive effects on wildfire aviation fail to satisfy modern 
requirements for air support in wildfire management. 
The cross-jurisdictional relationships and the inequality of wildfire resources 
among the states further complicate the management of wildfires. California remains the 
only state with dedicated, government-owned and –operated fire suppression aircraft for 
use in State Parks and private lands. All other states depend entirely on ad-hoc 
combinations of the already over-tasked Forestry Service-contracted assets, the Bureau of 
Land Management-contracted resources, the National Guard, or individually state-
                                                 
1“Station Fire: Forest Service’s Response Offers Potential Lessons for Future Wildland Fire 
Management” (Washington, DC: GAO, December 2011), 1, accessed from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587075.pdf. 
2“Station Fire,” 1. 
3Ibid., 49. 
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contracted assets. National Guard units in high-threat states must split training and 
operational budgets to meet increased demands for assistance. The contract-based 
approach and its high cost, low availability resources have exacerbated jurisdictional 
rivalries and territorial divisions among federal agencies, states, and local communities.  
The federal government, through the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest 
Service (FS) and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 
manages nearly the entire nationwide aviation aspect of wildfire management efforts. The 
FS employs airtankers that have rapid reactivity and large ranges to help keep small fires 
small.4 Aviation activities include vital support for the ground through direct attack on 
fires, smokejumper parachute teams, fire retardant application, resupply, air ambulance, 
and aerial ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).5 The number of the 
essential large airtankers available to fight fires in the United States has dropped “from 
44 in 2002 to 8 in early 2013.”6 
The government’s wildfire management has often been criticized for its 
diminished resources, failed modernization programs, and inflexible structure.7 Nine 
studies since 1995, both independent and government-commissioned, highlight the urgent 
need for aviation reform and the lethargic response by FS and BLM. Critics charge that 
the current system inefficiently divides management and resource allocation across 
federal, state, local, and tribal jurisdictions, placing lives and infrastructure at risk. Blazes 
like the Station Fire bear out these criticisms. 
                                                 
4“National Study of Airtankers to Support Initial Attack and Large Fire Suppression: Phase 1” (USDA 
Forest Service, Department of Interior: 1995), x, accessed from 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/publications/aviation/nats1_report.pdf 
5“Management Efficiency Assessment on Aviation Activities in the USDA Forest Service” 
(Management Analysis Incorporated, 2005), 3, accessed from 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/management/assessments/av_mgmt_efficiency_assessment_summary.pdf 
6“Fire Improvements Needed,” 1. 
7“Wildland Fire Management: Improvements Needed in Information, Collaboration, and Planning to 
Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Program Success” (Washington, DC: GAO, August 2013), 36, accessed 
from http://www.iawfonline.org/2013_GAO_Air_Tanker_Study.pdf. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
According to many critics, aviation support for wildfire management in the 
United States lacks a coordinated structure across jurisdictions and maintains a 
vulnerable dependency on contracted assets.8 The escalating demand for air support 
requires a reevaluation of the current system and a fresh organizational framework that 
focuses assets, operators, and perishable corporate knowledge under federal auspices. A 
unified effort for fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned systems can better meet the 
challenges of modern and future wildfires.  
Often, and increasingly today, the U.S. armed forces are called on to contribute—
or provide entirely—the necessary air suppression, but fighting domestic wildfires 
represents a mission well outside the Department of Defense’s primary national security 
responsibilities. It also raises the specter of civil-military imbalances—whether or not 
Posse Comitatus forbids such activities. Thus, one part of that unified effort that needs to 
be reevaluated is the role of the U.S. military. The military operates many types of 
firefighting aircraft, but is generally limited to a supporting role in today’s wildfire 
management efforts. It may be time to change this model. The frameworks of the military 
services in active duty, the National Guard (NG), and the Coast Guard offer alternatives 
for direct absorption or reorganization of the entire wildfire aviation industry. 
This thesis examines the question: What is the appropriate operational framework 
to provide better air support for wildfire management in the United States? In finding the 
best model, the research must answer the following additional questions: Why is the 
current system of air support failing to meet demands and by what metrics is it measured? 
What are the best models for wildfire aviation reorganization: the active duty military, the 
National Guard, or some new agency contained within DHS?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Maintaining U.S. national security and protecting critical infrastructure, property, 
and lives require capable and efficient air support to manage the growing wildfire threat 
                                                 
8“Fire Improvements Needed,” 11; “Firefighting Aircraft Study,” 70–71.  
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in the United States. Wildfires present significant hazards in much of the United States, 
creating major financial effects through destruction of property, costing lives, and 
incurring high management costs. Wildfires are not just a local problem, but are a 
national security issue, particularly with respect to infrastructure. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that “since 2000, numerous fires have each cost 
more than $75 million to suppress” and caused hundreds of millions of dollars of 
damage.9 A RAND study found that “every year between 2000 and 2010 saw more than 
$1 billion in federal suppression expenditures, including 2002 and 2006, when 
expenditures exceeded $2 billion.”10 Air suppression assets remain a vital fixture of 
initial attack strategies on small, growing fires and suppression of large wildfires.  
C. PROBLEMS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis argues that, beyond additional assets, the U.S. wildfire suppression 
system requires a new model, built around sustainable firefighting forces and 
organizational adaptability, in order to meet the increasing demands placed on it today. 
Wildfire management require continuous operations of aircraft to gain full control of fires 
and halt their spread. Lacking standardization, contracted forces consisting of rare and 
dissimilar aircraft significantly increase maintenance costs and unavailability to the 
mission, as parochial maintenance crews lack interoperability and mutual support.  
In her book Spying Blind, Amy Zegart writes that “organization matters… 
structures create capabilities and jurisdictions, determining who performs what task by 
what authority at what level of competency.”11 The problems facing our current method 
for fighting wildfires are largely organizational. An overreliance on contracted services 
restricts firefighting organizations from adapting with the changes in their mission. 
Because contracted units lack any incentive to innovate and must consider costs of 
                                                 
9“Station Fire,” 4. 
10Edward G. Keating, Andrew R. Morral, Carter C. Price, Dulani Woods, Daniel M. Norton, Christina 
Panis, Evan Saltzman, Ricardo Sanchez, “Air Attack Against Wildfires: Understanding U.S. Forest Service 
Requirements for Large Aircraft” (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2012), 14, accessed from 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1234.pdf. 
11Amy B. Zegart, “Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, And the Origins of 9/11” (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 196. 
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service improvements against financial benefits, the only change typically considered is 
to expand existing services—an expensive and inefficient solution to a growing problem.  
It is possible, however, to design a more effective and efficient system. Wildfire 
management efforts, like other government services, can be examined through a cost-
benefit analysis that considers the overall costs to the public and economy that are 
incurred, and weighs those costs against the need for safe and efficient mission 
completion. Altering the incentives away from dependency on contracted assets can 
encourage innovative methods to minimize the shared public costs of wildfires. Instead 
of inefficient contract costs to the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management, 
publicly owned and operated aviation assets can maintain relatively fixed costs; this may 
spur investments for innovations like UAVs and night flying.  
The analysis of this thesis develops from several assumptions. The first 
assumption is that climate change follows the existing standard models and will spread 
extreme fire conditions beyond the traditional Western United States. Conventional 
models hold that increased temperatures, droughts, and other intense weather shifts will 
place the rest of the United States in extreme risk for wildfires. Scientific studies 
conclude that the entire U.S. wildfire risk will increase over the next half century due to 
climate change. The National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory 
Committee (NCADAC) cites significant evidence that climate changing tendencies  
exist and will continue.12 The NCADAC writes that the “U.S. average temperature has 
increased 1.5°F since 1895,” and forecasts “another 2°F to 4°F” in the next 30 to  
50 years.13 Amid such heat and the likely drought to attend it, the Western United States 
“will be increasingly affected by large and intense fire that occur more frequently,” and 
                                                 
12“National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee Report: Introduction - Letter 
to the American People” (Washington, DC: National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory 
Committee 2013), 1, accessed from http://ncadac.globalchange.gov/download/NCAJan11–2013-
publicreviewdraft-letter.pdf. 
13“National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee Report: Introduction–
Executive Summary” (Washington, DC: National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory 
Committee 2013), 3, accessed from http://ncadac.globalchange.gov/download/NCAJan11–2013-
publicreviewdraft-chap1-execsum.pdf. 
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the East may experience “rising temperature combined [sic] with seasonal dry periods, 
more protracted drought and/or insect outbreaks to trigger wildfires.”14  
The second assumption is that the current system is insufficient to meet 
contemporary demands for aviation support to wildfire suppression. In turn, the existing 
system remains incapable of meeting greater demands from a more expanded regional 
threat.15  
The present research hypothesizes that the cultural resistance to change and 
innovations within the FS and BLM requires the transfer of aviation responsibilities to 
programs that maintain higher levels of transparency and accountability, and which can 
bring new technologies to bear on the problem. Greater accountability for proven results 
incentivizes technological advancements and operational improvements. The continued 
development and incorporation of new assets, like UAVs, compels wildfire aviation to 
adapt coherent strategies to interoperate in a congested airspace. These new aviation 
wildfire responders could come from the active duty military forces, the National Guard, 
or some new agency within DHS, and this thesis proposes to compare these three 
possible solutions.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A paucity of information and scholarly study exists in the realm of aerial 
suppression of wildfires. In an effort to correct deficiencies and justify larger budget 
requests, the Department of Agriculture’s Forestry Service and the Department of the 
                                                 
14National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee Report: Forestry” 
(Washington, DC: National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee 2013), 266, 
accessed from http://ncadac.globalchange.gov/download/NCAJan11–2013-publicreviewdraft-chap7-
forestry.pdf. 
15“Fire Improvements Needed,” 12. 
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Interior’s Bureau of Land Management commissioned nine studies since 1995 focusing 
on aviation in wildfire management.16  
In a 2013 Congressional Research Service publication, Kelsi Bracmort discusses 
the current federal function and commitment to wildfire management. The report 
illustrates the roles FS and BLM in contemporary wildfire suppression. The costs of 
wildfire suppression increased steadily over the past several decades, with “more than 
$2.7 billion … appropriated for WFM in FY2012.”17 The long-term outlook tends to see 
an increase federal suppression costs, the numbers and sizes of wildfires, and the effects 
on effected communities. The federal response, through the FS and BLM, coordinates 
with the individual state and local resources depending on the jurisdictional make up of 
the effected lands. The FS holds responsibilities for “national forests and grasslands 
fires”; DOI handles “national parks, wildlife refuges and preserves, Indian reservations, 
and on public lands.”18  
Fatal mishaps in 2002 and two more in 2012 have prompted calls for better 
program management. In 2002, two separate incidents occurred where older contracted 
airtankers experienced wing separation from the aircraft in flight killing all aboard. The 
year 2012 saw one National Guard C-130 aircraft crash into the ground just days after 
                                                 
16“ Airtankers Phase 1”; “National Study of (Large) Airtankers to Support Initial Attack and Large 
Fire Suppression: Phase 2” (USDA Forest Service, Department of Interior: November 1996), accessed from 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/publications/aviation/nats_final_phase_2.pdf; National Study of Tactical Aerial 
Resource Management to Support Initial Attack and Large Fire Suppression” (USDA Forest Service, 
Department of Interior Bureau of Land Management: October 1998), accessed from 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/publications/aviation/tarms.pdf; “Wildland Fire Management Aerial Application 
Study” (Sandy Oregon: Fire Program Solutions LLC, 17 October 2005), accessed from 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/publications/aviation/nats3_wfmaas_report_final.pdf; “Management Efficiency 
Assessment on Aviation Activities in the USDA Forest Service” (Management Analysis Incorporated, 
2005) accessed from 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/management/assessments/av_mgmt_efficiency_assessment_summary.pdf; 
“National Interagency Aviation Council: Interagency Aviation Strategy” (National Interagency Aviation 
Council, 24 August 2009), accessed from 
http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/budget/requests/6244655_FSNIAC_Strategy_Final.pdf; “Large Airtanker 
Modernization Strategy” (USDA Forest Service, 10 February 2012), accessed from 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/aviation/airtanker_modernization_strategy.pdf; “Air Attack 
Wildfires,”“Firefighting Aircraft Study.” 
17Kelsi Bracmort, “Wildfire Management Federal Funding and Related Statistics,” (Washington, DC: 
CRS, 30 August 2013) 1, accessed from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43077.pdf. 
18 Bracmort, “Wildfire Federal Funding,” 5. 
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being activated to support wildfire efforts.19 Finally, in May of 2012, FS began to collect 
information for the effectiveness of large airtankers, but FS has failed to gather metrics 
on helicopters and single engine tankers.20 FS collection efforts encountered resistance 
from industry operators based on fears of safety with over tasking of crews on missions, 
resistance from the industry culture against changes, and concerns over the retributive use 
of the information.21  
Several reviews called for better information collection and performance metrics 
of aviation suppression of wildfires. The AVID study wrote that the need for information 
comes from the Forestry Service policies of containing wildfires in the initial attack 
through extensive use of tankers.22 Beyond cost alone, the report accounted for “the 
effects of ground crew, aircrews, support systems, weather models, and other factors.”23 
The GAO repeatedly called for the “collection of information on the performance of 
firefighting aircraft,” to include successful drops, effects of the drops on the fire, and on 
what terrain the drop took place.24 Without performance matrixes, the success of the 
policies remains an unproven assumption, and “there is not enough data” to find the 
crucial measurement of efficiency.25 To conduct their models and studies, AVID and 
RAND had to extrapolate and assume information from simple flight time logs. 
Currently, no standards exist to empirically measure the effectiveness of aviation assets 
on wildfire, but AVID created its study from the number of unfulfilled orders against the 
number of orders placed.26  
                                                 
19“Fire Improvements Needed,” 27. 
20“ Fire Improvements Needed,” 15. 
21“Fire Improvements Needed,” 16. In British Columbia, Canadian wildfire pilots complete after 
action reports after flights, and the data collected has helped adjust firebase locations for more expeditious 
responses. Working for the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, firefighting aircrews complete 
similar reports that include mission specifics and program improvements.  
22“ Firefighting Aircraft,” 14. 
23“Firefighting Aircraft,” 16. 
24“ Fire Improvements Needed,” 15.  
25“Firefighting Aircraft,” 14–16. 
26“ Firefighting Aircraft,” 19. 
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The percentage of filled and unfilled orders provides a glimpse into the fleet size, 
but fails to quantify their effects on the wildfire management. With increased numbers of 
aircraft having the biggest effect, the study concluded that the percentage of unfulfilled 
orders reached “a point of diminishing return beyond about 40 or 50 airtankers,” at 
average historic demands.27 Aerial firefighters are reluctant to perform post flight 
effectiveness surveys due to concerns from their potential usage by the Forest Service to 
critique the contractors. The GAO wrote that a “firefighting culture that values 
experience and history over data and scientific analysis,” hurts academic study of the 
programs.28  
In prepared testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, the Managing Director of Natural Resources and Environment, Patricia 
Dalton, delivered a wildland fire management report critiquing the current system of  
fire suppression effectiveness and budget restraint. Dalton described that the system  
fails to share budgetary burdens with state and local governments when encountering 
multijurisdictional wildfires. Without prior agreements, the “federal agencies typically 
fund the costs of these activities from their wildland fire suppression accounts.”29 The 
financial responsibilities, usually incurred by the federal government, reflect the lack of a 
cohesive strategy and tactical leadership to achieve the “overarching goal of suppressing 
wildland fires at minimum cost.”30  
Dalton misses the necessary requirements of wildfire suppression by assuming 
cost overages derive from an unnecessary dependence on expensive resources. Relying 
on presumed inexpensive ground assets alone, protracted engagements to suppress 
wildfires unnecessarily risks lives and expansion of wildfires. Countering Dalton’s focus 
                                                 
27“Firefighting Aircraft,” 71; “Firefighting Aircraft,” 64. 
28“ Fire Improvements Needed,” 16. 
29“Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but 
Additional Action is Needed to Address Remaining Challenges,” (Washington, DC: GAO, 21 July 2009) 3, 
accessed from http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123076.pdf. 
30“Fire Important Steps,” 12. 
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on the immediate budget, wildfire strategies that employ aviation resources can “reduce 
unnecessary risks to firefighters” and long-term costs to the community and the nation.31 
Many experts use the Station Fire in late summer of 2009 to highlight key 
vulnerabilities within the existing framework. Some critics hold that the fire escaped 
initial containment efforts due to the short supply of air assets. A GAO report in 2012 
discussed the shortcomings of the response.32 Hampered by rough terrain and high fire 
conditions, the Station Fire effort employed massive federal, state, local, and contract 
assets, with more than 5200 firefighters working the blaze at one point or another.  
Some observers claim the mishandled response to the Station Fire is indicative of 
the lack of accountability within the Forest Service.33 They claim the FS aversion to night 
flying wasted valuable time to control the fire and permitted the spread. The GAO wrote 
the FS hold that “the risks of flying at night outweigh the benefits.”34 Whether due to 
crew experience, aircraft compatibility, or institutional fear, the FS practice of avoiding 
night air assets endangers firefighters and reduces management efforts. In addition, critics 
claim a FS memo, three weeks before the Station Fire, encouraged cost saving measures 
of quickly replacing “non-federal crews with the service’s own personnel and equipment” 
on the scene of a fire.35 The peak aviation support for the Station Fire had eight 
airtankers, seven helicopters, and two very large airtankers on 28 August.36 With the 
current FS tanker size, the Station Fire would have occupied almost all of the nine 
airtankers available nationwide.  
                                                 
31Ibid. 
32“Station Fire.” 
33“Station Fire,” 28; Paul Pringle, “Critics Say Firefighting Changes Slow to Come Since Station 
Fire” (Los Angeles: LA Times, 28 April 2011), accessed from 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/04/critics-say-firefighting-changes-slow-to-come-since-
station-fire.html; Paul Pringle, “Federal Inspector General Launches Probe of Station Fire” (Los Angeles, 
LA Times, 4 August 2010), accessed from http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/04/local/la-me-station-fire-
20100804. 
34“Station Fire,” 28. 
35Paul Pringle, “Before the Station Fire, A Cost-Cutting Memo” (Los Angeles, LA Times, 02 October 
2009), accessed from http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/02/local/me-station-fire2.. 
36“Station Fire Lessons,” 16–17. 
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1. An Active Duty Option  
Although little research has been conducted examining the potential benefits of a 
greater role for active duty military forces in wildfire air support, many experts have 
discussed the benefits and drawbacks of an increased active duty military role in 
Homeland Security and disaster management scenarios. The continuation of the military 
assumption of disaster management duties carries into the specifics of aviation support 
for wildfire suppression. Key arguments reside in the wealth of literature from the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the post 9/11 discussions integrating the active 
duty military and USNORTHCOM with other federal, state, and local agencies. 
One barrier, however slight, to military assumption of wildfire aviation duties 
rests in the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). Jennifer K. Elsea wrote for the CRS a piece 
titled “The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch,” which discussed the 
origins of PCA of 1878, 18 USC § 1385, from Civil War Reconstruction removal of the 
military occupation and law enforcement duties in former Confederate states.37 
According to Elsea, the PCA was intended to bar the Army and later through changes and 
DOD directives applied to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps from domestic law 
enforcement duties. Congress has authorized military exceptions by directly giving a 
branch certain authorities, creating rules for specific assistance, and laws authorizing 
specific cases.38 The PCA regulations against military law enforcement fail to apply to 
the use of the military in natural disasters and emergencies, like wildfires.  
The CRS also issued a report examining the Stafford Act as the solution to Posse 
Comitatus limitations on domestic military assistance. In 1988, the Stafford Act amended 
the 1974 Disaster Relief Act and codified the exceptions for federal, including the 
military, use in national emergencies. The Stafford Act established “an orderly and 
continuing means of assistance by the federal government to state and local governments 
                                                 
37Jennifer K. Elsea, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch,” (Washington, DC: 
CRS, 21 August 2012), 2, accessed from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42669.pdf. 
38Ibid. 
 12 
in carrying out their responsibilities.”39 The president of the United States possesses 
significant latitude to determine the conditions threshold to provided assistance to 
“supplement State and local efforts and capabilities.”40 The request by the state governor 
establishes the only prerequisite for the president to implement federal assistance. In the 
case of wildfires, the Stafford Act authorizes the president “to provide assistance, 
including grants, equipment, supplies, and personnel, to any State or local government for 
the mitigation, management, and control of any fire on public or private forest land…that 
threatens such destruction as would constitute a major disaster.”41 The interpretation of 
the wildfire clause permits the president to take action “to prevent a forest or grassland 
fire from becoming a major disaster.”42 Through the Stafford Act and the 2006 Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, the president may utilize all federal 
agencies to assist in disasters.  
The “Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned” presented an 
important model of active duty military only aviation wildfire support through 
USNORTHCOM. The report identified the DOD as “one of the only Federal departments 
that possessed real operational capabilities to translate Presidential decisions into prompt, 
effective action on the ground.”43 The DOD employed its large professional manpower, 
“robust communications infrastructure, logistics, and planning capabilities.”44 
USNORTHCOM commanded the active duty and Federalized, Title 10, National Guard 
forces in a cohesive effort.  
                                                 
39Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as Amended, and Related 
Authorities, (Washington, DC, FEMA, June 2007) 1, accessed from http://download-
88flood.www.gov.tw/otherReC/file/stafford_act_fema_592_june_2007.pdf. 
40Stafford Act, 2. 
41Stafford Act, 48. 
42Francis X. McCarthy, “Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible 
Activities, and Funding,” (Washington, DC: CRS, 7 June 2011), 2, accessed from 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33053.pdf.  
43The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, (Washington, DC: The White House 
Executive Office, February 2006), 54, accessed from 
http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf. 
44Katrina Lessons Learned, 54.  
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The Katrina report discovered significant drawbacks from a wholly militarized 
response. The DOD operates on specific requests from the tiered system of civilian 
authorities and require presidential authorization to fulfill these requests. The DOD lacks 
the authority to focus the entire response as “state and local governments maintain 
operational control over their own resources.”45 The primary mission of the military lies 
in the vital defense of the United States overseas, and the report noted that “the solution 
to improving the federal response to future catastrophes cannot simply be “let the 
Department of Defense do it.”46 
Military units focus on their primary war fighting missions and may lack the 
proficiency in the highly demanding skill of aerial fire suppression. The crash report for a 
U.S. Air Force C-130 operating in firefighting duties in 2012 indicated the dangers. 
While military aviators maintain highly capable and professional flying skills, the rapid 
switching between regular missions and fire suppression leaves the crews at a 
disadvantage. The military only option of aerial wildfire suppression expands the existing 
system of annual rotation of one of four squadrons from the Air National Guard and Air 
Force Reserves flying the supplemental flights for each wildfire season. The crash report 
listed recent MAFFS training changes that relaxed the proficiency standards failing “to 
provide a more realistic learning environment for new and seasoned MAFFS 
crewmembers.”47 Listed in the crash report, the primary cause of the mishap was poor 
communication of changing weather conditions and pilot error. Reduced crew 
proficiency at MAFFS missions and high cockpit workloads at low altitudes pose 
possible contributing factors.  
2. National Guard Option  
Here, too, there has been little work done focused on the role of National Guard 
forces in wildfire aviation, but there is a broader literature that can inform our discussion. 
                                                 
45Katrina Lessons Learned, 72. 
46Katrina Lessons Learned, 54.  
47“United States Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report: C-130H3, T/N 93–1458,” 
(Charlotte, North Carolina: U.S. Air Force, 27 October, 2012), 34, accessed from 
http://wildfiretoday.com/documents/MAFFS_crash_report_1-Jul-12.pdf. 
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Several key authors debate the ramifications of an increased NG employment in domestic 
emergencies. The general assumption of emergency management flows into the NG 
expansion beyond support for aviation wildfire management into a full assumption of the 
federal responsibilities. The discussions touch on the unique hybrid nature of NG assets 
to operate in either a Title 10 status (federal), state active duty, or default Title 32 status 
(federal funding under state control).  
Shane Crofts analyzed a unique framework in his NPS masters’ thesis for the NG 
following the end of armed conflict in Iraq and eventually Afghanistan. Crofts developed 
three options to restructure the NG. The first option placed the NG as “primarily a HLS 
force focused on domestic missions.”48 The NG would remain a strategic reserve for 
major conflicts, but it would focus, shape, and train for primary Homeland Security and 
Defense missions from deliberate and non-deliberate causes. With a drawdown in forces 
from the past decade plus of war, strategic military planning and force capabilities fall 
short of national defense obligations without a dual focused NG. Crofts wrote that option 
one “would require a fundamental paradigm shift in the train-equip-deploy cycle the 
ARNG has used for the past 60 years.”49 This option pertains to this thesis in the far-
reaching effects of withdrawing valuable assets with a sole focus on wildfire suppression 
or any Homeland Security mission. The second and third options involve maintaining 
operational reserve capacity to supplement national level military missions balanced with 
Homeland Security and Defense responsibilities.  
Major T.C. Frantz, USMC, describes the NG as the most logical fit to represent 
the DOD in the Homeland Security mission set. Frantz envisions a NG focused on 
emergency management through the “established divisional structure and localized, 
consolidated response capability” of the modern NG.50 Through the “unique federal-state 
status,” the NG offers a close local relationship with first responders, a dispersed 
                                                 
48Shane C. Crofts, “Shaping the National Guard in a Post-War Environment,” (master’s thesis, NPS, 
September 2012), 38, accessed from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=725827. 
49Crofts, “National Guard Post-War,” 42. 
50Maj. T.C. Frantz, “The National Guard–DOD’s Logical Homeland Security “First Responder” for 
the 21
st
 Century” (master’s thesis, USMC Command and Staff College, AY 2004–2005), 1–2, accessed 
from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520237.pdf. 
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presence near almost every major population center, and immediate legal authority to 
operate in any response scenario.51 The thesis recommends a reorganization of the state-
based system into regional units able to respond to individual governors, build 
relationships and capabilities with first responders, and provide dedicated assets to 
NORTHCOM.  
In 2001, a RAND report on the “Third Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction” provided recommendations directly pertaining 
to the NG. The report suggested that NG units “be assigned homeland security missions 
as their primary missions with combat missions outside the United Sates as secondary 
missions.”52 The NG units would train and equip for primary homeland security missions 
to include emergency management with state and local first responders.  
A 2008 master’s thesis by Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Steenson presented the 
NG as a bridge between the DOD and the homeland security mission. Steenson argues 
that the historic use of the NG from Olympics security duty in 1996 to the post 9/11 
airport security missions and combat air patrols, CAP, over major metropolitan areas has 
established the NG as the DOD homeland security unit. In 2004–2005, NG units 
provided air and ground assets to operate with and assist Customs and Border Patrol, 
CBP, agents along the southern border of the United States; the operation saved CBP 
“over $8 million…from the combining the command and control structure.”53 The use of 
state Emergency Management Assistance Compact, EMAC, has permitted state 
governors to regionally share NG assets in an emergency without involving the lethargic 
federal government; Steenson remarked that “Florida received help from 35 states during 
                                                 
51Frantz, “DOD First Responder” 2. 
52“Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Washington, DC: RAND, 
15 December 2001), 52, accessed from 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/nsrd/terrpanel/terror3-screen.pdf. 
53LCOL Michael S. Steenson, “The National Guard: DOD’s Interagency Bridge to Homeland 
Security” (master’s thesis, National Defense University Joint Forces Staff College, 14 April 2008), 53, 
accessed from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a487129.pdf. 
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the 2004 hurricane season.”54 The NG represents the local tier of first responders and 
accomplishes homeland security missions with the flexibility to avoid intrusive federal 
government entanglements.  
3. A DHS Option  
Following the 9/11 attacks, researchers debated the federal shifts of agencies and 
the creation of DHS. The debates evolved through the federal role, the agencies 
transferred to DHS, and the national plans for federal responses to terror, later to include 
all hazards. The resulting DHS force and mission places the seeds for assumption of 
greater emergency management responsibilities under the federal umbrella.  
As delivered in the primary missions of the strategic plan for FY 2012–2016, 
DHS emphasizes the departmental focus on mitigation of disasters through an all hazards 
approach. The strategic plan listed the department must “prevent high consequence 
events by securing critical infrastructure assets, systems, networks, and functions.”55 
DHS prioritization of hazard mitigation requires greater presence in the growing hazards 
of wildfire. Fulfilling the all hazards pitch, the DHS goals include a “robust mitigation 
core capabilities to reduce vulnerabilities.”56 The mitigation piece requires active steps 
and resources to work with state, local, and other federal agencies to reduce a disaster’s 
impact.  
The National Response Framework (NRF) of 2013 provides the responsibilities  
of the DHS to fulfill the federal commitments for state and local disaster responses. 
Through included risks, the NRF concludes that “natural hazards—including hurricane, 
earthquakes, wildfires, and floods present a significant and varied risk across the 
country.”57 As a core tenet of the NRF, DHS advocates and facilitates the implementation 
                                                 
54Steenson,”National Guard Bridge” 56. 
55“Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan” (Washington, DC: DHS, February 2012), 5, 
accessed from http://www.uscg.mil/history/docs/DHS/DHS-StratPlan2012–2016.pdf. 
56“Strategic Plan” 15. 




of an “effective, unified command” through interoperability. Within DHS, the USCG has 
“the authority to take action to respond to oil discharges … including leading the 
response.”58 The NRF illustrates the proactive nature of the DHS to meet the five mission 
areas of disasters: “prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery”; the exact 
functions of DHS agencies remain fluid as the system evolves.59  
A 2005 GAO report championed radical reorganization in the government to 
confront 21st-century challenges.60 The GAO wrote that the government “cannot accept 
all of its existing programs, policies, and activities as “givens.”61 The federal government 
“must take a more systematic, reasonable approach to allocating resources.”62 Changes to 
the system must reflect fiscal limitations of the federal government and responsible 
preparations for practical, persistent threats and hazards. The GAO recommended the 
implementation of a drastic “executive reorganization authority” to hasten agency 
changes without the delays of Congressional oversight.  
The GAO released a report in 2006 reflecting the limitations of the post 9/11 
response system to endure catastrophic events.63 Following the 9/11 attacks, the federal 
response shifted away from casual assistance to state and local major emergencies 
restrained completely by the Stafford Act; the new system, led by DHS, provided 
proactive assistance and capabilities. The federal government accepted the bill for state 
and local capabilities enhancements, “with about $11 billion in grants distributed from 
fiscal years 2002 through 2005.”64 With the lessons of the Hurricane Katrina response, 
the GAO advocated continued federal capabilities to respond more effectively to large 
disasters or prevent their formation from smaller disasters. In a post 9/11 and Katrina 
                                                 
58National Response Framework, 18. 
59National Response Framework, 1. 
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United States, the GAO wrote that “first responders should be able to respond swiftly 
with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective actions to save lives and property.”65 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses a policy analysis framework to determine the most appropriate 
structure for the future of wildfire aviation support. Through review of professional 
studies and industry documents, this thesis examines the existing model of aviation 
wildfire support for policy weaknesses/strengths and cultural barriers to industry 
improvement. This thesis evaluates three alternative courses of action by which different 
organizations might assume the full federal wildfire aviation suppression responsibilities. 
An analysis of California’s 2009 Station fire illustrates the existing system processes  
and shortcomings and provides a touchstone to apply the three alternative operational 
frameworks. 
This thesis examines the societal, legal, financial, and organizational 
considerations to major changes in defense structure and operations in homeland security. 
The legal criteria include: political implications to change; and legal requirements, 
policies, and restrictions. The societal analysis includes popular perceptions and opinions; 
and national security implications. The financial metric considers the significant 
budgetary costs and savings of program shifts or creations. The organizational section 
studies the mission effectiveness, tangible bureaucratic and cultural changes, framework 
uniqueness, and material assets of the options. In addition, the organizational category 
utilizes the Station Fire scenario as a touchstone for the different operational methods of 
the three options.  
Additionally, this thesis incorporates decades of industry studies, government 
reports, cases studies, legal reviews, and lessons learned. Federal government and DOD 
professional literature for general homeland security tasking form the backbone of the 
policy options breakdown. Rather than add another critique of a decade of homeland 
security maturation, the research focuses on the distinctiveness of wildfire suppression 
and its unique fit into homeland security threats and hazards.  
                                                 
65“Emergency Preparedness,” 4. 
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Through the comparative analysis of the three policy options, the most effective 
and appropriate policy option reflects a restructuring of wildfire aviation support and 
does not incorporate any changes to ground efforts or present wildfire management 
strategies.  
F. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II scrutinizes the current organizational framework and the background of 
the 2009 Station Fire in southern California, through the use of aviation assets, the 
tactical shortcomings, and contemporary abilities to meet another similar wildfire. 
Chapter III analyzes the full active duty military option, including advantages of 
capabilities, political roadblocks, primary national security mission costs, and how the 
option would change the Station Fire scenario. Chapter IV investigates the full National 
Guard option, including consideration of how NG units would differ from active duty 
military units, the roles of National Guard in Homeland Security missions, and how the 
Station Fire would have differed with a National Guard aviation response. Chapter V 
evaluates the U.S. Fire Guard option, a new armed forces branch under DHS. Such an 
agency would be organized along the model of the U.S. Coast Guard, and this chapter 
considers the new agency’s advantages compared to the other options, and how the 
agency might have responded to the Station Fire scenario. Finally, Chapter VI presents 
policy recommendations and areas for additional study.  
This research suggests the National Guard option is the strongest. The National 
Guard maintains forces spread across all 53 states and territories, placing it in a unique 
position to respond without major changes to the force. Disaster response plans, like the 
National Response Framework, support National Guard use in disaster management, and 
the National Guard dual federal and state roles provide flexibility to operations.  
 20 
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II. EXISTING CONTRACTED APPROACH 
On 26 August 2009, an arsonist started a costly wildfire in southern California 
that took the lives of two veteran firefighters and highlighted the deficiencies in the 
current wildfire management organization. This wildfire became known as the Station 
Fire. The media response to the Station Fire and the public uproar that followed focused 
on allegations that the Forest Service throttled back its response to conserve funds. The 
outcry brought political attention to the incident management organization, most notably 
the administration and use of aviation assets.  
This chapter examines the Station Fire and argues that it is a tragic example of 
this nation’s dysfunctional system for fighting wildfires, and in particular of the 
limitations of current aircraft wildfire fighting methods. The first section of the chapter 
reviews the history of the Station Fire, while the subsequent sections examine the 
limitations that this fire demonstrated in the United States’ reliance on contracted aviation 
support, the breakdown of the current contracted system, and the cultural factors that 
greatly shape the way aircraft are employed to fight wildfires. The chapter concludes by 
assessing the safety, innovation, and cultural faults with the contract based system.  
A. STATION FIRE 
With rough terrain, high winds, and accumulated dry vegetation, the conditions 
were primed for the Station Fire to grow to a dangerous large wildfire. Continuous 
drought in the western United States left significant dried vegetation around the Angeles 
National Forest. In late August 2009, southern California’s high summer temperatures 
and low humidity hastened the growth and spread of the blaze after the arsonist’ set it at a 
highway pullout. High winds fanned the flames on the rough terrain and intensified the 
fire. The Station Fire was destined from the beginning to challenge containment efforts as 
the fire spread to 15 to 20 acres in the first hour.66  
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The initial report of the fire was made at 1515 on 26 August, and the first units 
arrived within 15 minutes. A robust initial attack was possible thanks to the already 
activated suppression efforts on the burning Morris Fire in another part of the Angeles 
National Forest that permitted a rerouting of several inbound Morris Fire firefighters to 
the Station Fire. By 1630, some 175 firefighters, 14 fire engines, seven helicopters, and 
two air tankers had diverted from the Morris Fire and responded in the initial attack of the 
Station Fire. A moderately experienced incident commander took charge of the response 
to coordinate the extensive resources on the rough terrain.67  
Firefighters reported that the flames were eight to ten feet high. According to the 
2012 GAO investigation, “agency firefighting doctrine indicates that flame lengths 
greater than 4 feet are not safe for firefighters using hand tools to attack directly.”68 Thus, 
officials opted for an indirect attack strategy with ground crews flanking the fire on the 
sides of the slope and airtankers laying retardant barriers at the hill top. The two 
airtankers dropped 15,000 gallons of retardant, during the afternoon. The seven 
helicopters delivered a combined 142,000 gallons of water to reduce the fire’s intensity 
near ground crews.69 During the initial attack on the first day, the incident commander 
turned away a large Martin Mars airtanker that carried important firefighting gel due to a 
lack of urgency to find a suitable target.70 Unable to fly at night due to doctrinal 
restrictions and equipment capabilities, the airtankers and helicopters returned to their 
bases just before official nightfall.  
The initial attack had only a few hours of daylight to mount a containment plan 
before night halted almost all efforts. Operations planned for the next day amounted to a 
“mop-up” operation, rather than a sustained robust response. The moderately experienced 
commander turned the responsibilities over to a less-experienced commander and 
                                                 
67“Station Fire,” 11–14. 
68“Station Fire,” 12. 
69“Station Fire,” 11–14. 
70“Station Fire,” 26. The Martin Mars is a large amphibious airtanker that carried firefighting gel on 
the evening of Station Fire initial attack. The gel was later dumped on the nearby Morris Fire following 
confusion, miscommunication, and eventual turn away from the incident commander and aviation 
coordinator of the Station Fire.  
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released several ground units, which he believed were no longer needed. The incident 
commander had ordered only two helicopters for assistance the second day, 27 August. 
When the reports trickled in that the fire may have escaped containment, the incident 
commander ordered several airtankers to assist the next morning. The orders for these 
extra airtankers were placed in an informal request that failed to convert over to an 
official request, due to forgetfulness by the dispatching agent.71  
In hindsight, the incident commander’s actions were clearly insufficient; but they 
were in keeping with the standard Forest Service practice. In the meantime, with all 
aircraft on the ground the first night, the incident commander lacked situational 
awareness of the Station Fire; it escaped containment and grew massively in the dark 
without aviation support to the ground crews in rugged terrain. In other words, the fire 
became exactly what official had discounted after those first few hours. A small patch of 
unburned vegetation known as the “green island” gapped the containment barriers around 
the wildfire. In the dark, the green island ignited swiftly and spread the wildfire across a 
highway, well outside the fire lines constructed to hold it back. The incident commander 
failed to use night-flying helicopters loaned from Los Angeles County to contain the 
wildfire as it unexpectedly spread beyond the highway barrier. Three night-flying 
helicopters were in use during the day initial attack, but the incident commander failed to 
request their continued use during the night.  
Even as the blaze expanded out of control the next day, the incident management 
system failed to utilize crucial aircraft assets. Vital airtankers and helicopters remained 
unutilized in the vicinity of the Station Fire. The untapped resources included ten contract 
airtankers in southern California that could have reached the fire early in the morning and 
three CAL FIRE, (California’s state-run fire service) airtankers that CAL FIRE held in 
strategic reserve, not for use by Forest Service. 
More was at work in these decisions than the misapprehension of the fire’s size. 
Budget concerns predominated—and made everything much worse. Later testimony by 
                                                 
71“Station Fire,” 29. The Department of Agriculture’s Inspector General determined that the lack of 
phone recordings for extra airtankers did not exist and could not determine the cause of the lost informal 
request. However, changes to the official procedures and recordings of all GACC request lines were 
implemented to prevent a reoccurrence.  
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incident commanders and other wildfire experts highlighted fiscal austerity as a cause for 
resource restraint on the Station Fire. A Forest Service memo, released just before the 
Station Fire, described an impending budgetary shortfall and urged officials to use Forest 
Service assets before state or contracted resources, even if those assets were closer.72 The 
increasing costs of wildfire aircraft, operation and maintenance, depleted the wildfire 
suppression funds and contributed to the budget shortfall.  
The incident commander adhered to the official Forest Service moratorium on 
night flying. These restrictions against night flying owed to the framework based upon 
the use of contracted assets. Without any departmental motivation to incorporate already 
common innovations like night-vision devices, the Forest Service in 2009 maintained the 
official doctrine that the “risks of flying at night outweigh the benefits.”73 The contract 
system failed to incentivize aircraft vendors to innovate or acquire newer, night-capable 
aircraft, and so the safe and very, common capability of night flying was unavailable to 
challenge the outdated Forest Service regulation. Ultimately, the vendors lacked any 
incentive to dispute Forest Service regulations as either way, day or night, their contracts 
were paid; day flying allowed them to keep using older aircraft and save the overhead 
from purchasing new, more advanced ones. Thus blame for the Station Fire escape and 
escalation falls on the restraining Forest Service doctrine and the passive contract-based 
framework.74  
The incident commanders were too preoccupied with fiscal constraints to form a 
sufficiently thorough plan to contain the wildfire. In the end, this calculus proved penny-
wise but pound-foolish; the ultimate costs included the lives of two firefighters, the 
scorching of 160,000 acres, the destruction of 89 homes, the efforts of some 5,200 
                                                 
72“Station Fire,” 37; Pringle, “Station Fire Cost.” 
73“ Station Fire: Forest Service’s Response Offers Potential Lessons for Future Wildland Fire 
Management” (Washington, DC: GAO, December 2011), 27, accessed from 
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firefighters, and $95 million before the blaze could be declared extinguished on 4 
December.75  
B. CONTRACT-BASED SYSTEM  
Response for the Station Fire followed the U.S. wildfire management strategy of 
an escalating commitment of resources and priorities based through the incident 
management system. Within the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), the wildfire Incident Command System and 
Wildland Fire Complexity describe the evolution from small to large fires.76  
1. Existing Wildfire Management Strategies 
Upon discovery of a wildfire ignition, local units assess the developing incident 
and risks in the initial response phase. The initial response phase encompasses the 
“immediate decisions and actions taken to react to an ignition.”77 Usually the 
responsibility of local fire departments, the initial response includes action, the decision 
to delay actions, and their rationale. When actions are taken to manage the wildfire by the 
first resources to arrive, the initial attack phase begins; these actions include “size up, 
patrolling, monitoring, holding action, or aggressive initial attack.”78 Generally, initial 
attacks are characterized by the least complex wildfire with “a single resource (Type 5) to 
several single resources (Type 4),” and an anticipated containment within one operational 
phase.79  
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76Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Interior and Department of Agriculture, January 2013), 08–13.  
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If the initial attack fails to contain the wildfire or if it grows too rapidly, the 
incident transitions to the extended attack phase and additional contingency resources and 
prioritization are given to the wildfire incident. The typical extended attack phase is a 
Type 3 incident with less than 100 acres consumed, increased resources, greater attention, 
and expectations that additional time is required to contain the wildfire than the initial 
attack.80 The extended attack concludes when the wildfire is contained or controlled  
or the indecent management escalates into a more complex large fire incident. Though  
a small percentage of wildfires, a large fire requires immense resources, organization, 
support, and incident management professionals for a Type 2 or Type 1 event.81 
Eventually, the incident concludes with the containment or suppression of the wildfire.  
The Station Fire began as a Type 4 incident and grew into a Type 3 during the 
initial attack. In the height of the wildfire spread, a Type 1 commander led more than 
5000 firefighters and flight crews.  
Wildfire management doctrines emphasize the importance of a dominant initial 
attack. Released in 2012, the Forest Service’s “Large Airtanker Modernization Strategy” 
aims to support robust initial attack resources with faster, longer range, and higher 
capacity airtankers able to respond to isolated fires rapidly. The Modernization Strategy 
added that a “1.5% drop in initial attack success rate is estimated to represent 
approximately 150 fires that could escape initial attack, which would cost the Forest 
Service an additional $300 million to $450 million to suppress.”82 The 2013 Interagency 
Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations claims that “fires are easier and less 
expensive to suppress when they are small…full suppression, aggressive initial attack is 
the single most important method to ensure safety of firefighters and the public and to 
limit suppression costs.”83 The Department of the Interior’s and the Department of 
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Agriculture’s 2014 “National Strategy” echoed this theme, declaring “safe aggressive 
initial attack is often the best suppression strategy to keep unwanted wildfires small and 
costs down.”84 The Station Fire maintained a strong initial attack during the few hours 
before nightfall. After dark, the fire had several hours of unimpeded growth before the 
incident commanders even knew the fire had escaped containment efforts and even 
longer before daylight could permit resumed attacks. 
Wildfire management actions follow two separate suppression strategies: direct 
attack and indirect attack. Both strategies include extensive use of ground crews with 
picks and shovels, earthmoving heavy equipment, and aircraft. In rough terrain with steep 
slopes, aircraft provide the most accessible assets to attack with either strategy. 
Direct attack represents the suppression efforts that attempt to both extinguish the 
existing burning materials and prevent continued spread.85 With focused efforts right at 
the wildfire’s edge, direct attack includes use of water and other suppressants to 
extinguish burning material and the construction of a fireline or barrier holding the fire’s 
advance.  
Indirect attack takes place a distance away from the spreading wildfire to contain 
the long-term growth; indirect attack does not include efforts to extinguish already 
burning material.86 Suppressants and retardants combine with physical firelines and 
barriers to affect an indirect attack. A controlled burn or backfire is used in an indirect 
attack to consume easily ignited material, usually underbrush, to reduce susceptible fuel 
for the growing wildfire and change the advancing course.87  
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Wildfire management direct and indirect strategies employ a host of different 
chemicals in specific roles. Retardants deter or slow combustion, and suppressants 
extinguish or contain ignited fuels. Delivered via airtankers or fire engines, retardants  
are “a substance or chemical agent which reduces the flammability of combustibles;” 
many retardants have chemicals or salts that “change the way fuels burn.”88 Short-term 
retardants work to deter combustion only as long as they remain wet; long-term 
retardants “are effective even after the water has evaporated.”89 Large airtankers can lay 
long swaths of retardants to assist in the direct or indirect attacks. Fire suppressant foams 
combine chemicals with water to increase the adhesive, smothering, moistening, or 
cooling properties of water.  
When the water is evaporated, fire suppressant foams cease effectiveness.90 
Increasing the “viscosity and adhesion” of water, fire-fighting gels and other water-
enhancers provide more effective firefighting tools than ordinary water, but they lose 
their effectiveness when the water has evaporated.91 Plain water offers short-term fire 
suppression through cooling and wetting fuels and has a smaller price tag than chemical 
enhancers. Scooper airtankers and helicopter bucket delivery system deliver high cycle 
lifts of water from bodies of water near wildfires.   
2. Wildfire Aircraft 
With unique capabilities of speed and accessibility, aircraft can rapidly deploy to 
remote and rugged terrain that would hinder ground crews. Aircraft fill the following 
roles: deploying water, fire suppressants, and fire retardants; detection and tracking of 
wildfires; observation, command, and control of wildfire strategies; transport and 
evacuation of grounds crews to and from remote areas; air ambulance; aerial resupply of 
ground crews; and aerial ignition of controlled burns.  
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Within the United States, the fleet of aircraft involved in wildfire management 
falls into several distinct categories. Fixed-wing (airplanes) and rotary-wing (helicopters) 
complement each other in the same roles but fall under different groupings. The airtanker 
category covers all fixed-wing aircraft that deliver water and fire retardants in accordance 
with the management strategy to contain, slow, or extinguish wildfires. The smokejumper 
category is all fixed-wing aircraft that deliver parachuting smokejumpers and supplies to 
remote areas. With the utility and multi-mission capabilities of helicopters, the broad 
rotary-wing category covers all helicopters regardless of their specific purpose or 
configuration. The fixed-wing surveillance aircraft category includes light observation 
aircraft that provide command and control of aerial assets around a wildfire. In addition, 
surveillance aircraft direct ground firefighting efforts and “guide airtankers over fires to 
assist in accurately targeting retardant delivery.”92  
Authorities break airtanker groupings into further subcategories based on 
performance and function. Maxing out the airtanker volume, very large airtankers deliver 
a minimum 8000 gallons of retardant; they are generally retrofitted commercial aircraft 
DC-10s and Boeing 747s with 11,600- and 20,000-gallon capacities, respectively.93 
Large airtankers carry a minimum of 1800 gallons and are subdivided into Type 1, over 
3000 gallons; and Type 2, 1800 to 2999 gallons. Large airtankers include legacy P-3 
Orion, C-130, P2V, C-27J, and other former military cargo planes and commercial 
aircraft converted into airtankers.94 Large and very large airtankers possess high cruising 
speeds and long ranges ideal for large areas of response. Type 3 and Type 4 airtankers 
carry 800–1799 and less than 799 gallons, respectively.95 Within these groups, water 
scoopers are amphibious aircraft capable of scooping or siphoning water from accessible 
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bodies of water to dump on wildfires.96 Additionally in Type 3 and 4, single-engine 
airtankers (SEATS) represent low-cost airtankers based off retrofitted crop-duster aircraft 
like the Air Tractor series.97  
3. Wildfire Dispatch  
The U.S. wildfire management system utilizes a coordinated request process to 
deploy aviation assets to wildfire incidents. The request system integrates federal, state, 
local, and tribal assets through a regionalized, hierarchical chain for resources. At the 
lowest level, local dispatch centers take delivery of reports of wildfires and assign local 
firefighters, fire trucks, equipment, and aircraft to respond, when available; the local 
dispatch centers can operate independently in a closed-loop or within collective 
agreements with other local jurisdictions for mutual support. The local dispatch centers 
coordinate “initial attack responses and the ordering of additional resources when fires 
escape initial attack.”98  
If local units lack adequate resources for a wildfire or the initial attack fails, the 
local dispatcher requests additional resources from their assigned geographic area 
coordination center (GACC). Each GACC determines priorities, resource allocation, and 
contingency mobilization within their region.99 GACCs are a series of eleven interagency 
run regional dispatch centers that coordinate resources and response efforts for escalated 
wildfire management incidents. When GACCs need additional assets, they request to the 
National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC), located at the National Interagency 
Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho. The NICC “coordinates allocation of resources to 
one or more coordination centers or major fires within the nation,” in addition to 
coordinating responses to other non-wildfire national incidents.100 The NIFC is the 
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primary body for allocating, assigning, and coordinating firefighting assets, equipment, 
standards, doctrine, and policies at the national level.101  
The United States has international cooperation agreements for wildfire resources 
with Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand.102 The NIFC continuously 
coordinates Canadian and Alaska mutual wildfire cooperation in air and ground support 
well beyond the immediate borders.103 In addition, the NIFC facilitates supplementing 
the recently deficient U.S. airtanker fleet with Canadian airtankers.104 
4. Wildfire Contracts  
The contract-based system for aviation assets relies on a divided, multilayered 
operational framework. The FS and the BLM divide the contracts for aviation wildfire 
assets between categories. The Forest Service holds the responsibility for wildfires 
occurring on “national forests and national grasslands.”105 In addition, the FS negotiates 
and maintains contracts for large and very large airtankers and large and medium 
helicopters. Conversely, the Bureau of Land Management maintains responsibility for 
wildfires on “national parks, wildlife refuges, and preserves, and Indian reservations, and 
on public lands.”106 The BLM also manages the contracts for SEATS and scoopers.  
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The contract-based system utilizes two types of contracts: exclusive-use and call-
when-needed (CWN). The exclusive-use contracts entitle wildfire management to 
complete use of the aircraft during the contracted times and available at anytime during a 
“mandatory availability period.”107 Generally wildfire management officials contract 
large airtankers and helicopters on exclusive use for entire fire seasons. CWN contracts 
permit the vendors to perform other earning tasks with the aircraft, like crop dusting, 
cargo, or logging.  
When the CWN is activated, the vendor has a requisite response time to have the 
aircraft and crew available for wildfire tasking. Like a retainer, per-day fees reflect the 
vendor’s loss of the aircraft to perform other paying contracts. Per-flight hour fees reflect 
the costs incurred in fuel, operation, and maintenance of the aircraft. Exclusive-use 
contracts include both per-day fees and per-flying-hour fees. Incurring only high per-
flight hour fees, CWN contracts are more expensive per day when flown than exclusive-
use, but they offer flexibility to adjust the size of the fleet as the season progresses.108  
The contracted fleet varies on fulfillment of demand depending on the levels  
of requests and seasonal fire intensity, but airtankers fill approximately 60 percent to  
75 percent of the orders each year.109 Plagued by poor maintenance and structural fatigue 
from airtanker duties, the large airtanker contractor fleet fell from 44 aircraft in 2002 to 
only 8 in 2013.110 The year 2011 saw 11 percent of requests filled by Canadian airtankers 
and contracted by Alaska with cooperation of the Forest Service.111 
C. AIRCRAFT COSTS AND FUNDING 
The contract-based model for aviation has caused the federal wildfire suppression 
costs to escalate since 2000. As the general appropriations for wildfires increased, the 
expense of aviation assets increased. Due in part to amplified demand with historically 
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massive wildfire seasons and drought conditions in the western United States, the initial 
budget requests from the Forest Service and BLM have fallen short and forced mid-
season budget scrambles to find the additional funding.  
The elevated wildfire threat and management strategies’ dependency on 
aggressive use of aviation assets has strained the existing fleet. Airtankers have increased 
their annual flight hours and increased the wear on ageing aircraft.112 With the average 
age of large airtankers at 50 years, additional stress and increased annual usage shortens 
the airtanker fleet’s safe and cost-effective life span. The increased usage in the early 
2000s forced an early retirement on several airtankers and increased the burden share on 
the remaining aircraft, exacerbating the individual wear.113 As a result of the 2002 fatal 
mishaps and the political fallout, the Forest Service, in 2008, required contractors to 
establish an intricate safety inspection and maintenance program to comply with stricter 
FAA standards.114 Though an improvement to the safety of wildfire aviation, these 
additional maintenance costs have risen to keep the aged fleet operational, and 
contractors pass that expense on to the contracting agencies. Daily airtanker costs have 
doubled from 2007 to 2010, increasing from $15 million to $33 million.115 The contract-
based model for the Forest Service has not accommodated the increased costs, nor has the 
Forest Service found a suitable alternative.  
The modernization plan for the Forest Service includes perpetuation of the same 
cycle of contract-based maintenance and operation with federally procured former 
military use aircraft. The Station Fire incident commanders were influenced to restrain 
resources out of aviation cost concerns. The hesitation allowed the wildfire to expand and 
cost over $95 million to finally contain.  
Changes in the federal funding practices have altered the fiscal controls in dealing 
with increased costs for wildfire suppression. Traditional funding provided in excess of 
two thirds of the federal fire funding to the Forest Service and the remaining third to the 
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Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management. During the 1990s, the Forest 
Service and Bureau of Land Management averaged wildfire suppression appropriations at 
$.92 billion. From 2002 to 2012, the same funding has ballooned to average $3.13 billion, 
with a peak of $4.47 billion in 2008.116 The Forest Service and Bureau of Land 
Management spent greater than “$2.4 billion on federally- contracted firefighting aircraft, 
fuel, and retardant.”117 Historically, surge funding for extreme wildfire years came from 
Congressional supplemental emergency funds propping up internal departmental fund 
reorganization and repurposing by the FS. The FS borrowed money from the Knutson-
Vandenberg (K-V) Fund, a $500 million fund from harvested timber proceeds on 
government lands to replant within three years, and congress would appropriate funds to 
repay the K-V Fund balance.  
In 2010, the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement (FLAME) 
Act established wildfire suppression reserve funds for the FS and BLM to permit 
suppression efforts without restrictions or unnecessary fiscal restraint. According to 
University of New Hampshire professor, Dr. Ross Gorte, the FLAME Act removed fiscal 
responsibility from the wildfire management effort and “provides no incentives to reduce 
or constrain the firefighting costs.”118 In 2009, the Station Fire fiscal worries restrained 
an aggressive attack, and so the prior to the FLAME Act the opposite over reaction 
gripped incident commanders. In comparison, spending an extra few thousand for more 
aircraft could have alleviated the $95 million final price.  
D. EFFECTS OF THE CONTRACT-BASED APPROACH 
The poorly crafted contracts for airtankers have worsened the wildfire aviation 
fiscal and performance problems. The Forest Service issues short-term—usually 
annual—contracts that leave vendors without long-term assurances of income. In the 
absence of long-term predictability, vendors elect to make do with patching together 
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existing assets at the loss of lasting sustainability and growth. Vendors see no financial 
benefit for acquiring new assets with uncertainty of their recoupment on investments. 
Safety is continuously sacrificed when contracts penalize aircraft unavailability for 
service; thus, the long used FAA “public-use” status permitted maintenance loopholes for 
cost shaving vendors to fly unsafe aircraft. With the increased safety inspections on worn 
out aircraft and risk acceptance, the contract-based system experiences cost increases 
with minimal benefit to wildfire suppression.119 
1. Maintenance and Safety 
Poor aviation safety culture and maintenance practices remain at the forefront of 
criticism against the contract-based framework. The 2002 Blue Ribbon Panel found 
safety an underlying cause of excessive costs of wildfire suppression. Since 1958, the 
“abysmal” safety record for wildfire aviation has seen 136 large airtanker crew members 
die in aircraft mishaps.120 Contract personnel maintain a lower safety standard than their 
government counterparts due to their aircraft maintenance and operational flight 
envelopes.  
Post-military aircraft converted to airtanker duties maintain an FAA “public-use” 
status that rests all safety considerations and inspections with the proprietor for 
airworthiness. The use of the aircraft for government functions qualify them as “generally 
exempt from complying with Federal Aviation Regulations.”121 The FAA only requires 
an operator to “advise regional FAA officials that the aircraft was designed and built for a 
military mission, and that the aircraft is not unsafe when operated in the firefighting 
role.”122 All former military airtankers operate under the “public-use” status.  
The contract-based system leaves the airworthiness and safety of individual 
aircraft, including publicly owned but maintained and operated under contract, with the 
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vendor. The operational model of contracts incentivizes the vendor to profit and stretch 
the airworthiness and safety of the aircraft, without any oversight or accountability by the 
FAA or the FS. Even worse, the Blue Ribbon Panel found that the FS and BLM officials 
fail to understand the FAA certification and oversight duties for FS- and BLM-contracted 
aircraft. The failure of FS safety policies culminated in two fatal aircraft structural 
failures in flight in 2002, but FS waited nine years, until 2011, to remove the remaining 
similar aircraft from flying status.123 The 2014 airtanker fleet still includes many legacy 
Korean War-era aircraft.  
2. A Stagnant Culture  
With decades of inadequate contract funding and cost-efficiencies, the wildfire 
aviation culture has evolved over time to accept insufficient standards and make do with 
the inferior assets and training. The brave “can-do” attitude has served both effective and 
deadly; the missions are completed but at the cost of indispensable human and aircraft 
capital. One aviation officer said that wildfire aviation is “captured by our own success; 
we always manage to find a way.”124  
The aviation wildfire culture fostered by the contract-based model has eroded safe 
and effective aviation operations. From the top down, the wildfire aviation community 
has developed a dysfunctional cultural process. Federal officials lack sufficient oversight 
of contractors and an understanding of safe aviation practices, as was evident in the  
2002 mishaps and following investigations. The Forest Service failed to understand the 
FAA “public-use” status of their contracted aircraft and the deplorable safety standards 
maintained by the vendors. The 2002 Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that the “Forest 
Service has exploited the passion and willingness of its firefighters to do more with 
less.”125 For large airtankers in particular, the average 15- to 20- year life cycle of 
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contractor aircraft types has disastrously ended with engineering or structural failures, 
usually fatal. The aircraft were flown until the problems were publicly unacceptable; the 
wildfire careers of B-17s, C119s, PB4Ys, and C-130As ended with catastrophic losses.126  
The government leadership’s apathetic transfer of all safety and maintenance 
responsibilities to the vendors created an accountability void. The government believed 
the vendors would maintain high safety standards of operation and maintenance without 
oversight. The vendors took advantage of the disconnect to operate substandard 
maintenance on aged aircraft flown in structurally stressful maneuvers, without 
consequences until a few of them fell out of the sky.  
The risk acceptance and inflexible culture encourages experience and skill over 
deliberate risk mitigation measures. Insulated in tradition, the culture refuses to adapt 
with other aviation fields or evolve through analysis of current methods. Contractor 
aircrews and the Forest Service are reluctant to perform comprehensive effectiveness 
studies due to fears of how the information will be used against them. The GAO has 
commented that the firefighting culture, “values experience and history over data and 
scientific analysis.”127 The resistance to reform has hampered national studies to better 
equip and fund wildfire aviation.  
The Station Fire was restricted to age-old methods of traditional dropping of 
retardant and water during the day only. With more analytical study of effectiveness and 
methods, the aviation tactics could increase efficiencies, reduce wildfire costs, and 
prevent more large wildfires.  
3. Innovation  
The contracting model provides little encouragement for the vendors or wildfire 
managers to innovate the strategies and capabilities of wildfire suppression assets. Forest 
Service and BLM contracts fail to financially encourage basic replacement assets from 
vendors and least of all promote advancements in tools and techniques. The U.S. military 
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has pioneered and long employed night flying with the aid of infrared and night-vision 
devices (NVD), but wildfire aircraft contractors and wildfire managers have failed to 
integrate their use. Commercial, civil, and military aircraft incorporate traffic collision-
avoidance systems (TCAS) into standard equipment, while only one airtanker vendor has 
implemented the safety system.128 Contractors fail to incorporate other safety equipment 
common in other aviation communities such as: flight data and voice recorders for 
misshape investigations and accelerometers to measure aircraft stress levels.129 Similarly, 
although UAVs are growing more prevalent in civil and military use, they have only 
achieved early testing and evaluation status in wildfire management through NASA and 
other agencies.  
The Forest Service and the BLM have failed to view wildfire aviation as national 
assets that require sufficient mobility and coordination to meet a national standard for 
operational procedures and techniques. Assets are forced to meet the most restrictive 
standard of the wildfire incident commander’s home agency (state, local, Forest Service, 
or BLM) and conform to varied operational restrictions over different jurisdictional 
airspace. Beyond a lack of forward thinking, the contract-based model has smothered 
innovations in favor of historical methods.  
The Station Fire could have benefited from increased innovation. UAVs would 
have provided continuous situational awareness to discover gaps and escapes in 
containment strategies. NVDs and night flying could have maintained the attack on the 
fire to contain it the first night. The Station Fire needed scientific methods and modern 
aircraft to prevent the wildfire’s escape, and without them it killed two firefighters and 
nearly threatened east Los Angeles.  
E. CONCLUSION 
To date, little reform has taken place within the operational structure or aviation 
organization of wildfire incident management. The existing contract-based framework is 
broken and a new operational model must arise to replace the dysfunctional structure. A 
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shortage of assets only exhibits a symptom of the greater problems hidden in the internal 
cultures and lack of incentives found in the contract model. Worthwhile in other 
businesses, the contract-based model has eroded Forest Service and BLM leadership to 
cast off responsibilities for safe aircraft for their crews to unmotivated vendors and 
inhibited growth of the wildfire management enterprise. The firefighting professionals on 
the ground and in the air deserve a system that efficiently utilizes resources and 
prioritizes safety on par with mission accomplishment.  
  
 40 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 41 
III. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY OPTION 
The Station Fire illustrated the flaws in the contract-based approach to wildfire 
aviation, but a deliberate analysis asks what other models exist to fill the aviation void. 
With out of control costs, cultural barriers to adaptation, and appalling safety standards, 
the contract-based model has failed to meet the ever-increasing hazards of wildfires. 
Various alternative solutions exist from simply retooling the current organization to 
complete replacement of the entire aviation program by another entity. This thesis will 
examine possible alternatives for the latter.  
The first alternative would have the active duty military assume aviation 
responsibilities from the contract-based organizational framework for wildfire support. 
Under this option, the active duty military services, their respective reserve forces, and 
Title 10 National Guard forces would accept full responsibility for aviation fixed-wing, 
rotary-wing, and UAV operations to fulfill the mission requirements of nationwide 
wildfire management. This chapter will examine the basic principles and appropriateness 
of the active duty military take-over of aviation wildfire through a legal/social analysis, a 
fiscal examination, and an organizational study. Finally, this chapter will apply the active 
duty military option to the Station Fire and examine the altered outcome.130 
A. LEGAL/SOCIETAL/NATIONAL SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Active duty military operation within the domestic United States faces specific 
challenges. Significant legal restrictions bare specific functions of the military within the 
homeland. Societal reactions and perceptions perceive the roles and actions of the active 
duty military in certain ways. Tangible risks are associated with reprioritizing military 
resources without additional assets to meet the new challenges.  
In the wake of the political restructuring in the years after 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina, domestic military operations and assistance in the United States have become 
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more frequent and more accepted. The establishment of the U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) has fortified the societal legitimacy and accountability of defense 
missions within the homeland, however homeland security still remains secondary to the 
overseas national security military missions.131 The prioritization of defense missions and 
force shaping remains focused on a global presence and engagement, while retaining 
sufficient forces for homeland defense and Defense Support for Civil Authority (DSCA) 
missions.132 The wartime demands for military forces overseas reduce the mission 
prioritization and pool of extra active duty forces available for homeland security 
missions.  
Historically, the prospect of general domestic military operations has aroused 
extensive opposition. The American public has a track record of skepticism and even 
outright hostility for military use within the United States, in particular military use in 
law enforcement. With extensive capabilities and often the only organized force, the 
military has responded to various disasters throughout the United States history from the 
1906 San Francisco Earthquake to Hurricane Katrina.133 In contrast, the military itself 
has resisted too much domestic responsibility and resists permanent DSCA mission areas 
in both lead agency and dedicated resource capabilities, unless directed by the Secretary 
of Defense.134 The American people, as well, maintain a fear of creating a praetorian 
military, disconnected from the larger social order. The Posse Comitatus Act established 
a statutory moratorium for military employment in enforcing laws, but statutory 
restrictions change with societal expectations, as the Stafford Act has for the DOD in 
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national emergencies and natural disasters. In 10 U.S. Code § 371 through § 382, 
Congress provided the framework for military assistance to law enforcement when 
requested for material support and the assistance remained passive.135 In the case of 
natural disaster or national emergencies assistance, laws have strengthened the ability of 
military assistance within the homeland.  
In 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act established a basic legal principle to prevent the 
usage of the military to enforce laws within the domestic United States. The Posse 
Comitatus Act was intended to end the post Civil War Reconstruction occupation of 
former Confederate states. The Act states: “Whoever, except in cases and under 
circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses 
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the 
laws,” shall be punished.136 Restricting the scope of military involvement domestically, 
the Posse Comitatus Act drew a distinction between legitimate national security missions 
and law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act solidified a societal constant in the 
United States, since the framers of the Constitution, to ensure that the military remained 
subservient to civil authority.137 As the principle actor able to exercise the states 
legitimate use of force, the military could threaten the very state employing it. If allowed 
to enforce and possibly create or interpret laws, an unrestrained military could present an 
unelected, armed body capable of exercising power without physical restraint by any 
government body or law. Threatening democracy, the long-term repercussions could see 
a military assumption of power and a return to authoritarianism, akin to British colonial 
rule, or the military employed for political purposes by incumbent officials.  
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Posse Comitatus does restrict law enforcement in military operations during 
natural disaster mitigation and relief efforts. Congress retains the power to provide 
explicit exceptions, rules, and authorities for the use of the military in specific types of 
operations, including natural disasters and national emergencies.138  
1. Advantages 
In contrast to the Posse Comitatus Act, the Stafford Act established procedures 
and circumstances for defense support for civil authorities during a national emergency or 
natural disaster. Originally the 1974 Disaster Relief Act, the 1988 Stafford Act amended 
the federal statute and firmed the role of FEMA, in response to significant natural 
disasters in the late 1980s. The most recent changes to the Stafford Act occurred in 2006 
following Hurricane Katrina to better facilitate a whole of government response to 
national disasters.139 The 2006 changes focus on expediting relief and enhanced 
mitigation efforts prior to an incident. As the primary authority for military assistance in 
domestic disaster relief, the Stafford Act accepts that “disasters often cause loss of life, 
human suffering, loss of income, and property loss and damage,” and that the state and 
local governments are overwhelmed by the severity of disasters.140  
There are three methods to gain federal assistance under the Stafford Act. First 
with the request and provided evidence of the disasters magnitude by the state governor, 
the president can declare a “major disaster.” The president may then, without limits, 
mobilize federal agencies and the “Department of Defense for the purpose of performing 
on public and private lands any emergency work, which is made necessary by such 
incident and which is essential for the preservation of life and property.”141 Second, the 
president may declare an “emergency” with the same request and evidentiary support 
from the state governor as provided for a major disaster. Emergencies are more limited in 
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financial assistance and support, equivalent to $5,000,000.142 Third, Section 403 of the 
Stafford Act permits in the “immediate aftermath of an incident which may ultimately 
qualify for assistance,” the president may, at the state governor’s request, direct the 
Secretary of Defense to utilize DOD assets “for the preservation of life and property”143  
Due to the unique nature and ability to fight wildfires, an additional method exists 
for DOD assistance under the Stafford Act specifically for wildfires. Section 420 of the 
Stafford Act establishes that the president has the same authority to provide major 
disasters assistance “for the mitigation, management, and control of any fire on public or 
private forest land or grassland that threatens such destruction as would constitute a 
major disaster;” however, the “declaration does not require presidential authorization.”144 
Wildfires, according to the Stafford Act, permit large preventative federal assistance. 
FEMA provides the majority of their relief assistance through this method. Additionally 
according to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOD provides assistance 
specifically for wildfires through two Stafford Act methods. First with FEMA operating 
in Section 420 of the Stafford Act and at a request from the state governor, FEMA may 
direct the Secretary of Defense to provide assets essential for the preservation of life and 
property under Section 403 for 10 days.  
Second under Section 420, FEMA coordinates for resources through the NIFC 
authority to order DOD assets, usually once the fire is contained and weakened and 
community assistance is required.145 The DOD has established specific procedures with 
the NIFC for military assistance. Previously, the DOD had two memorandums of 
understanding (MOU) in regards to wildfire support. In 1975, the DOD issued a MOU 
with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior agreeing to 
provide wildfire assistance. In 1990, a MOU between DOD and the NIFC amended the 
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1975 MOU and included the employment of DOD helicopters for wildfire support.146 
Active duty military personnel, equipment, and aircraft have responded to NIFC requests 
continuously under these MOUs.147 Superseding the MOUs, a 2006 interagency 
agreement established the procedures, circumstances, and priorities for DSCA for 
wildfire support. The NIFC has remained the hub for communications and requests for 
DOD assistance; a DOD Coordinating Officer embedded at NIFC’s NICC communicates 
between NORTHCOM and the requesting GACCs and Dispatch Centers. Offering only 
temporary assistance, DOD assets are requested once all civilian contract assets are 
expended or unavailable.148 The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
evaluates the DOD commitment and the Secretary of Defense authorizes the deployment 
of forces.149 
Since 1973, elements of the Air National Guard in a federalized Title 10 status 
have provided Modular Airborne firefighting Systems (MAFFS) to wildfire managers 
through the NIFC. MAFFS have contributed over 6,700 missions to deliver in excess of 
18.3 million gallons of retardant. Statutory authorization for MAFFS lies in the 1975 and 
1990 MOUs, the 2006 interagency agreement, and Economy Act. The Economy Act 31 
U.S. Code §1535 authorizes assistance between federal agencies with the understanding 
the receiving agency will reimburse the providing agency for the goods and services. In 
addition, the assistance is aimed to supplement contracted services that are unavailable, 
overwhelmed, or inconvenient.150 The OMB has confirmed the MAFFS operations are 
consistent with federal law and are “necessary and appropriate…to minimize the risk to 
public safety.”151 
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Additionally, the active duty military retains the immediate response authority 
(IRA) to provide DSCA in natural disasters, emergencies, and wildfire management. 
DOD Directive 3025.18 provides Federal military commanders with the authority to take 
immediate actions in response to a request from civil authorities “by temporarily 
employing the resources under their control.”152 Unless under prior higher guidance, 
commanders are authorized to take actions they deem necessary to “save lives, prevent 
human suffering, and mitigate great property damage within the United States.”153 The 
situation must reach the “imminently serious” threshold and must not afford sufficient 
time to gain higher approval. The IRA will last until other sufficient state, local, or 
federal assistance arrives; higher authority directs a halt to assistance, or by 72 hours 
from the initial request. Civilians remain protected from “military power that is 
regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.”154 
2. Disadvantages 
The American society acknowledges that the military should have a larger role in 
national disasters, especially wildfires. Societal forces in the United States accept the 
military assisting civil authorities in major natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina and 
Super-storm Sandy. Following Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Lessons Learned included 
a need for a more “integrated command structure” for DSCA and planning for situations 
“when it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to lead the federal response.”155 
Broadcast television, military recruitment commercials, and federal reports all display 
images of DOD members assisting in some disaster relief mission in the homeland, 
without significant challenges to their appropriateness.156 The U.S. public has accepted 
for decades DOD ground and aviation assets fighting wildfires; the aircraft color and 
crew uniforms at a wildfire are negligible. The incident command system and 
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mobilization plans already incorporate military units. The only change to the wildfire 
management would lie in who responds; local incident commanders, dispatch centers, 
GACCs, and the NICC would request all aviation elements from the military, instead of 
contractors.  
Neither the law nor the civilian public possess strong reservations against an 
increased military role in wildfires; the real bone of contention lies in the historic notions 
about what constitute U.S. military missions. The existing directives and statutory laws 
leave significant language to emphasize military prioritization for national security 
missions.  
The DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support for Civil 
Authorities declares that defending the homeland and DSCA are primary missions of the 
DOD; these missions include DSCA for natural or manmade disasters.157 The DSCA 
Strategy includes preparation for rapid response establishing that “arriving late to need is 
not an option.”158 The DSCA Strategy establishes a significant caveat to over-prioritizing 
the DOD for domestic missions. Homeland defense and global power projection has 
priority over DSCA.159 Force structure and resource commitments must stay oriented to 
the traditional military missions of fighting and winning the nation’s wars.160  
The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) echo the predominance of DOD mission focus on national security. The 2010 
NSS emphasizes the criticality of “strengthening the military to ensure that it can prevail 
in today’s wars; to prevent and deter threats…and prepare and defend the United 
States.”161The QDR establishes the three pillars for DOD to “protect the homeland,” 
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“build security globally,” and “project power and win decisively.”162 Only a portion of 
one pillar pertains to DSCA and response to natural disasters. The preponderance of 
DOD planning, force shaping, and strategic vision remains on national security related 
operations.  
The statutory law and interagency agreements acknowledge the DOD national 
security mission priority. Title 10 USC § 376 restricts the services and support provided 
under DSCA to civilian law enforcement “if the provisions of such support will adversely 
affect the military preparedness of the United States.”163 Unlimited during a national 
disaster, The Stafford Act limits DOD assistance during a designated emergency to only 
10 days.164 The Interagency Agreement for the Provision of Temporary Support During 
Wildland Firefighting Operations and prior MOUs condition that DOD resources are 
available only after civilian contract assets are “depleted and only when the incident has a 
bona fide need for additional air resources.”165 
The physical impact of assuming the aviation wildfire support may interfere with 
the national security missions of the active duty military. In 2006, Hurricane Katrina 
occupied a significant portion of military forces during a time of war. The military relief 
response to Hurricane Katrina included 58,000 U.S. Army and National Guard troops,  
21 naval ships, 350 helicopters, 75 fixed-wing aircraft, and an additional 300,000 
personnel available for assistance.166 Another major disaster may likely require the same 
level of response. Without any backup or relief forces for active duty military aircraft and 
crew in wildfire support, either the wildfire management teams are left without aviation 
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support or other national emergencies have reduced resources to respond. DOD austerity 
measures have seen the reduction of forces and equipment, further shrinking the 
fulfillment of multiple commitments.167  
Beyond the diversion of aircraft and crews, the financial and budgetary impact of 
wildfire suppression missions places a higher structural wear on vital military aircraft, 
and these aircraft will experience a shorter service life, as a result.168 When returned to 
military operation, the structurally weaker aircraft impose a higher safety risk for the 
aircrew and vital national security missions. In spite of maintenance support, an aircraft’s 
airframe or load bearing internal framework can only withstand a certain tolerance to 
massive pressures, vibrations, and other aerodynamic stresses before stress fractures 
retire the aircraft or result in catastrophic failure. The two fatal airtanker mishaps in 2002 
experienced the wings breaking off in flight due to long-term fatigue.169 The reduced life 
of military aircraft employed in wildfire support increases the costs to recapitalize the 
assets and creates long-term escalation of program costs within the DOD budget.  
B. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
The active duty option has several financial benefits over the contract-based 
system. The primary financial advantage resides in the cost-effective use of resources. 
The assets, maintenance, and operators come from a different budget, but without 
changes to the Economy Act reimbursement would still come from the Department of 
Agriculture and Department of the Interior wildfire management allocations. The active 
duty military already incorporate equipment and procedures into aviation that the contract 
system has failed to implement.  
1. Advantages 
The active duty military option utilizes the immense resources of the U.S. armed 
forces to maximize efficiencies for wildfire aviation. With a massive logistics, 
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acquisitions, manning, training, and budget appropriations network, the military has 
economy of scale in aviation and aviation support. All five services operate extensive 
fleets of aircraft from helicopters to massive cargo planes and UAVs. The established 
military infrastructure provides a ready pool of resources to increase the numbers of 
aviation assets available for wildfire support while avoiding the overhead costs of 
recapitalizing vendors’ aircraft. The Defense Logistics Agency overcomes the logistical 
challenges of supplying military forces overseas, and they would efficiently supply 
aviation assets operating from the homeland in wildfire missions. 
Absent in the contract-based system, standardization of procedures and equipment 
provides another fiscal cost savings. A joint acquisition and commonality in resources 
reduces maintenance costs and logistical complexity through interoperable aircraft 
mechanics and parts. Except for the U.S. Army, every service operates a variant of the C-
130 cargo aircraft, the same aircraft employed to utilize the MAFFS.170 As of February 
2014, U.S. military operated 636 C-130 aircraft; in comparison, the total large and very 
large airtanker fleet numbered at 11 aircraft.171 In addition, every service operates a 
variant of the Sikorsky H-60 Blackhawk helicopter, a medium lift helicopter often 
employed in wildfire support. Communication systems are criticized in the Hurricane 
Katrina Lessons Learned as lacking resiliency and interoperability, but communications 
equipment in the active duty military experience a high degree of standardization, 
robustness, and commonality, due in part to past failures.172  
The benefit of separating escalating aviation costs from the Department of the 
Interior and the Department of Agriculture lies in preserving the integrity of fuel 
reduction funds. Fuel reduction funds focuses on excess fuel and biomass reduction and 
removal from fire prone areas, especially in the WUI. Prevented from natural burn 
removal through aggressive wildfire suppression, the excess biomass and fuels have 
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accumulated increasing the intensity of wildfires. For years the Forest Service and BLM 
has re-appropriated money from fuel reduction efforts towards the soaring costs of 
suppression.173 The separation of wildfire aviation funding permits the focus of Forest 
Service and BLM on land management and the reduction of fuels accumulating in high 
risk areas; removing the growing fuel levels breaks the cycle of more intense wildfires 
and their massive suppression costs.  
Employing the active duty military includes the massive support from DOD 
research and defense companies. Since the inclusion of aviation in wildfire suppression 
after World War II, derelict and surplus aircraft have made up the bulk of the wildfire 
management fleet.174 In contrast, the DOD is renowned for employing cutting-edge 
technology and innovations through the defense industry and the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA).175 The extensive industrial and research base 
supporting the military continuously develops new tools and equipment.176 In the 
wildfire management role, the active duty military will employ many of these capabilities 
to enhance suppression effectiveness. Night vision devices (NVD), infrared imagery, 
UAVs, and advanced aircraft systems permit the military to provide aviation support 
around the clock without sacrificing safety.177 The extensive military experience in 
utilizing and coordinating multiple manned and unmanned platforms in confined airspace 
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permits a seamless integration of active duty military use of advanced technologies, like 
UAVs, immediately into the wildfire management missions.178  
For the military takeover of wildfire aviation, the costs have turned in favor of 
military aircraft. With higher salaries of military aviators and maintenance personnel, 
MAFFS experienced higher operational costs a decade ago; however, increased 
maintenance and operations costs have enlarged the contract fees. The 2004 actual costs 
for employing MAFFS—at $20,265 a day for two aircraft—was twice as expensive as 
comparable civilian aircraft at $10,844 a day for 2 P-3 airtankers.179 The 2013 actual 
costs for large airtankers have increased to a peak of $34,000 exclusive-use contract costs 
plus between $4,400 and $9,996 an hour flight costs.180 The per flight hour cost of 
MAFFS in 2012 was $13,952 and in 2013 $17,391; the dramatic differences in costs 
relate to the increased efficiencies from the increased use in 2012.181 The DOD-provided 
service has become more economical than the contracted vendors.  
2. Disadvantages 
The 1932 Economy Act governs interagency contracts and would compel the 
reimbursement to the DOD from the Department of Agriculture and Department of the 
Interior funds. Under the Economy Act, the requesting agency, the agency obtaining the 
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services, is required to reimburse the actual costs of services provided by the servicing 
agency.182 Even in the cases of emergencies, like the letters of agreement between DOD 
and the NIFC, the services requested must be reimbursed; if the services are provided at 
the receiving agency’s request, they are not free.183 The payments credit the fiscal year 
the services were performed and not the year the payments were made; if made the 
following year the money goes into the U.S. Treasury.  
The DOD has an exception and may utilize the funds into the current year.184 The 
reimbursement actual costs must reflect an accurate estimate of costs, including “salaries 
of employees,” equipment costs, and servicing costs; the estimates are forbidden from 
over or under charging.185 Title 10 USC § 380 obligates the Secretary of Defense to 
require reimbursement for services provided to other federal agencies; unless, the 
services provided benefited the DOD or were in the “in the normal course of military 
training or operations.”186 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The active duty military option outperforms the contracted system in terms of 
organizational structure and culture. After 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, the modern active 
duty force maintains a substantial resource base with established plans and procedures for 
operations to support DSCA. The well-configured military continues to evolve and 
incorporate advancements to the vital DSCA mission with lessons learned. The active 
duty military culture establishes a standardized capability to learn, adapt, and overcome 
challenges, while maintaining acceptable risk mitigation.  
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Since the 2002 creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the military 
forces in the United States have a central structural organ to coordinate and command 
military operations within the homeland. NORTHCOM’s mission is “to conduct 
homeland defense and civil support operations within the assigned area of responsibility 
to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.”187 NORTHCOM is a 
regional combatant command with an area of responsibility covering all of North 
America and the maritime and aerial approaches to the continent.188 The individual 
service regional component commanders own the forces and provide the resources, upon 
request, to NORTHCOM’s operational control. Recognizing a need for formal 
coordination, training, and operational unity, NORTHCOM acts to funnel connections 
between the DOD and civilian public and private entities. Through interagency 
agreements and partnerships, NORTHCOM has continued to build and solidify 
relationships between the DOD and federal, state, local, and tribal officials and first 
responders. NORTHCOM coordinates NIFC requests for forces through the interagency 
agreement for wildfire assistance and the deployment of MAFFS in federalized Title 32 
status.189 Learning from lessons of Hurricane Katrina, Super-storm Sandy, and exercises, 
NORTHCOM has sought closer partnerships and interoperability with civilian 
agencies.190 The DOD has a permanent, effective and adaptive central command and 
control structure for DSCA and homeland defense.  
The modern active duty military incorporates a significant culture of reform 
across all branches of the armed forces. Although at times staunchly stuck in tradition, 
the U.S. military has accepted and embraced substantial reforms and evolutions to 
military affairs and organization over the last century. The 1947 National Security Act 
                                                 
187U.S. Department of Defense, “USNORTHCOM Mission” USNORTHCOM, accessed 14 July 2014 
from http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/FactSheets/ArticleView/tabid/3999/Article/1891/usnorthcom-
vision.aspx.  
188Knight, “Roles Northern Command,” 2.  
189Interagency Agreement Firefighting,5; “Review Authorities Military Wildfires,” 8. 
190Knight, “Roles Northern Command,” 8.NORTHCOM purchased 22 identical mobile cellular 
system with FEMA and the National Guard Bureau to ensure coordinated communications during 
emergencies.  
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reorganized the military after the close of World War II and established a Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to lead the services and administrate military operations. The 1986 Goldwater-
Nichols Act reformed military operations to increase civilian oversight and 
standardization of military planning and acquisitions. The military infrastructure thrives 
on continuous long range strategic planning from Quadrennial Defense Reviews, 
National Defense Plans, National Security Strategies, and extensive commissions and 
congressional oversight committees. The transparency of structure and evolutionary 
nature within the U.S. military forms an adaptable culture.191  
A challenge with wildfire aviation is the staffing of trained and experienced crews 
to operate the aircraft. Professional and aggressive, military aviators press their aircraft to 
accomplish missions, but they do so with a full understanding of risk mitigation. 
Ingrained in modern military flight training and culture, risk mitigation fundamentals are 
continuously taught, honed, and evaluated to assure safe and effective mission 
accomplishment.192 What the military may lack in initial wildfire aviation experience 
they learn, adapt, test, and pass on the corporate knowledge to subsequent generations of 
aviators through professional analysis and scientific accountability. A cycle developed 
and tempered through a century of military aviation. The military incorporates tactical 
and operational evaluations into routine missions to ensure the most effective methods 
are employed. Unlike the contracted wildfire aviators, the active duty military encourages 
advancement of procedures through scientific analysis.193 In contrast to the contract-
based “old boys” culture of risk acceptance and individual experience, professional 
                                                 
191Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and 
Dfense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, July 2005), 140–143, accessed from 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph2_report.pdf. 
192U.S. Navy, Naval Aviation Safety Management System: OPNAV INST 3750.6S,(Washington, DC, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 13 May 2014), 2–3, accessed from 
http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/03000%20Naval%20Operations%20and%20Readiness/03–
700%20Flight%20and%20Air%20Space%20Support%20Services/3750.6S.pdf. OPNAV declares that risk 
mitigation is an all-hands effort and the key lies in risk management through hazard awareness, risk 
controls, and supervision. 
193“Fire Improvements Needed,” 15–16. The GAO reported that contractors worried about 
information collection on the effectiveness of drops due to concerns about the punitive nature of their use 
by Forest Service officials.  
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military aviators adapt and manage risk through tested procedures while accomplishing 
the missions.  
2. Disadvantages 
The active duty military faces challenges in the organizational takeover of 
wildfire aviation duties. The initial turnover would gap both defense responsibilities and 
capable wildfire aviation support missions. In the absence of established procedures, 
military aviators would maintain caution until a manageable safety margin was attained 
to maximize both effectiveness of aviation and safety of the aircraft and crews. The few 
years following the active-duty option could result in very dramatic wildfire outbreaks 
until the active-duty military adjusted to balancing resources and training for an effective 
wildfire aviation role. 
The existing organization of NORTHCOM hinders an efficient or effective use of 
the active-duty military. NORTHCOM lacks assigned units. Unlike the other Geographic 
Area Commands with continuously rotating resources of the various armed services, 
NORTCOM only controls a limited amount of staff and assets until an emergency. 
Wildfires are unpredictable and the seasons are growing in length; it is common for 
wildfires to start outside of the traditional wildfire seasons in many areas of the United 
States. NORTHCOM would need the same level of resource commitments to fulfill 
wildfire aviation mission within the homeland, in order to meet the ever present hazard 
and fluctuating seasons.  
D. STATION FIRE 
The active-duty option would have applied substantial improvements to the 
incident management of the Station Fire. The known quantity of military aviation 
capabilities would have provided the incident commanders with a standardized resource 
with expanded capabilities, beyond the contract system. The incident commanders would 
have focused on the most efficient means to manage the wildfire, instead of fiscal 
scrutiny of resource costs. With the active duty military, the management effort would 
have more and better assets to utilize.  
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1. Advantages 
Through consistency and standardization, active duty-military aviation provides a 
coordinated effort that maximizes resource utility against wildfires, like the Station Fire. 
In the military option, certain units designated through NORTHCOM and their internal 
service chains of command are deployed during the regional wildfire seasons with 
additional units available for surge. Fused together by uniform training and standard 
operating procedures, these aviation units provide a plug and play consistency with 
seamless transitions from one unit to the next. Building on the uniformity, military units 
with sufficient manning can keep high demand resources in the fight longer through 
swapping in fresh crews; the station fire would have had continuous aviation coverage. 
Experienced with multitasking and high workloads in the combat environment, the 
capable military aviators can collect data for effectiveness studies and tactical awareness 
of the wildfire advance. Wildfire tactics and strategies benefit from scientific analysis of 
aviation suppression efforts; without proof from objective study, wildfire tactics are 
simply a tradition. Combined with capable firefighters on the ground, military units 
would have been aggressive enough to contain the Station Fire during the first day’s 
initial attack, as wildfire suppression doctrine supports.  
The active duty military option overcomes the challenges and weaknesses of the 
original Station Fire incident response. Common and expertly applied across each 
service, night flying is a standard capability. With every unit safely able to operate at 
night, the Forest Service would have embraced properly risk managed night flying and 
maintained suppression efforts around the clock to contain the wildfire. UAVs, an 
integral part of the modern battlefield, would have maintained continuous real-time 
awareness of the Station Fire’s progression to recognize the containment plan was 
collapsing the first night. The fierceness of active duty military units complements the 
Forest Service, BLM, and incident management policies of aggressive initial attacks to 
keep wildfires small and less costly.  
The immediate financial burden and politicized second guessing of wildfire 
incident management disappears with active duty military aircraft. Incident managers can 
control costs with military aviation fees remaining constant without additional use or 
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retainer fees. In contrast, contract fees with exclusive-use, call-when-needed, and 
increasingly costly flight hour use fees discourage incident commanders from utilizing 
assets as enthusiastically as possible during an initial attack. Free to make objective 
decisions about efficient wildfire management tactics, incident commanders can focus 
their energies on the growing threats of wildfires instead of insulating themselves from 
post fire inquisition on wasted expenses or missed opportunities. Active duty aviation 
support breaks the chain of soaring costs and increased threats of wildfires.  
2. Disadvantages  
The drawbacks to active duty military aviation assets used in wildfire support are 
the risks to national security. A dwindling force in a time of fiscal austerity leaves very 
little surplus units and resources available to perform both missions well.194 During an 
active fire season, the national wildfire management strategy requires several hundred 
aircraft.195 Operating on the principle that national security takes precedence, the military 
will adequately source the peacetime overseas mission first and have units on rotation in 
domestic bases. The active duty units remaining in the United States continue to train, 
refit worn resources, and prepare to redeploy; they are not standing idly by. Tasking 
several hundred active duty military aircraft and crews to fight wildfires significantly 
reduces and jeopardizes military priorities for national security, homeland defense, and 
additional DSCA missions. The existing system permits temporary active duty military 
assistance for surges; the underfunded and overworked active duty can provide for 
infrequent support, not complete assumption of wildfire aviation.  
  
                                                 
194U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review: 2014, 1. 
195“Fire Improvements Needed,” 9–10. 
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IV. NATIONAL GUARD OPTION 
The active duty model established a viable option to the contract-based approach, 
but the National Guard option provides a uniquely American twist to the use of military 
forces in wildfire aviation. Through the establishment of the National Guard as a distinct 
state entity with organic authorities separate from the federally controlled military, the 
United States possesses a secondary military capable of taking over wildfire aviation.  
The National Guard alternative would replace the entire contract-based wildfire 
aviation support with elements of the National Guard Bureau, comprised of the  
Army National Guard and Air Force National Guard. Working under Federalized  
Title 10 status, State Title 32 status, or state active duty (SAD), the National Guard 
Bureau’s fixed-wing, rotary wing, and UAV units would assume all the missions of 
wildfire aviation support from airtanker duties to helicopter lift and surveillance. The 
scope would include the societal legal implications, financial analysis, and the 
organizational benefits of the National Guard over the contract-based system.  
A. LEGAL/SOCIETAL ANALYSIS 
The deployment of the National Guard within the domestic United States has few 
restrictions on the operational uses. Essential to the National Guard’s mission and 
creation, the homeland employment of the National Guard is specifically regulated by 
federal and state procedures. The American publicview National Guard employment in a 
dramatically different slant then that of the active duty military.  
1. Advantages 
The National Guard assumption of the national wildfire aviation mission faces 
few legal/societal barriers. Unlike their active-duty counterparts, the National Guard 
operates in both a federal and state capacity that permits circumvention of statutory 
restrictions on military assets. A substantial amount of legal and procedural doctrine 
governs the use of National Guard units in DSCA, homeland defense, and emergency 
responsibilities, like wildfire duties. In general, the American public expects and 
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demands the use of the National Guard in many natural disasters and emergencies; 
however, national security and homeland defense mission readiness remains an obstacle 
to remain a balanced force, if the National Guard assumes the entire aviation wildfire 
role.  
Mandated by the U.S. Constitution, the National Guard has evolved into a unique 
dual-status operational reserve for the U.S. military. Article 1 Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution permits Congress to, 
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the 
United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the 
officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by congress.196 
The federal government of the United States and the individual states retain 
authorities over the National Guard. Under Title 10 status the federal government with 
the President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief can nationalize the National 
Guard for federal duty. The individual governors retain both state active duty status and 
Title 32 status for their individual states National Guard units. Under SAD status, the 
state pays the complete bill for the National Guard and retains command through the 
State Adjutant General to the governor; under Title 32 the federal government pays the 
bill but the governor retains command.197  
The Posse Comitatus Act fails to impact the National Guard assumption of 
wildfire aviation due to the nature of wildfire suppression missions and the unique status 
of the National Guard. Intended to restrict law enforcement by the military, the Posse 
Comitatus Act does not prohibit military support of natural disasters, national 
emergencies, and wildfire support. Wildfire suppression and management are not 
considered law enforcement activities, and therefore those who participate in these 
                                                 
196Constitution of the United States: Article 1 Section 8, accessed 14 July 2014 from 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html. 
197“Defense Management: Actions Needed to Ensure National Guard and Reserve Headquarters Are 
Sized to be Efficient” (Washington, DC: GAO, 14–71, November 2013), 6–8, accessed from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658978.pdf. In 2013, the federal government paid $11.1 billion or about 90 
percent of National Guard funding.  
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actions are not subject to the Posse Comitatus restrictions. In addition, National Guard 
assets under State Active Duty or Title 32 status remain under the command of their state, 
not the federal government, and are subject to that states’ laws and restrictions on any 
activities within that state. Under a federalized Title 10 status, National Guard units are 
restricted by Posse Comitatus like the active duty military.198  
As discussed in the previous chapter, existing statutory law and agreements for 
active duty DOD apply to the National Guard in national emergencies and disasters when 
it is operating in a federalized Title 10 status. When the federal government wants to both 
pay for the use of the National Guard and federally command them, the president may 
apply a Title 10 status to federally activate the National Guard units. While in Title 10 
status, National Guard units are indistinguishable from regular, active duty military. Title 
10 status National Guard units fall under the command of the overall DOD and 
NORTHCOM for DSCA and homeland defense missions; this applies the Stafford Act 
DOD procedures to these National Guard units. The Stafford Act presidential declaration 
of national emergencies and disasters, restrict the operations, reimbursements, and 
command of the Title 10 National Guard units, as if they were active duty. The Stafford 
Act recognizes the unique hazards of wildfires and authorizes DOD assistance with 
governor request but not requiring presidential authorization.199 In assuming wildfire 
aviation roles, the Title 10 National Guard units parallel the active duty military 
procedures of Stafford Act Section 403 for presidential authorization after becoming a 
national emergency and Section 420 before becoming a national emergency or disaster. 
In addition, Title 10 National Guard units comply with the interagency agreement and 
MOUs between DOD and The Department of Agriculture and the Department of the 
Interior through the NIFC.200 National Guard commanders in Title 10 status retain the 
Immediate Response Authority of active duty military commanders to use their resources 
for temporary assistance to civil authorities upon request, without having to wait for 
                                                 
198U.S. Congress, Posse Comitatus Act; Elsea, “Posse Comitatus Sketch,” 1.  
199FEMA, The Stafford Act, 48,; “Review Authorities Military Wildfires,” 3.  
200Interagency Agreement Firefighting , 3–5. 
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higher authorization.201 Title 10 status National Guard units are active duty military and 
have the same restrictions until returned to the states. 
State Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard units retain unique abilities 
granted from their individual states. Within their own states, National Guard units may 
exercise their authorities granted through their respective chains of command through the 
state Adjutant General and the governor.202 A governor has the authority to engage the 
state’s National Guard units in natural disasters, wildfires, or other tasks. In an expression 
of the state governor’s authorities to use their National Guards as they see fit, four states 
established the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) in 1996 and 
received Congressional approval in P.L 104–321. Now comprising all 50 states, Puerto 
Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Washington, DC, EMAC recognizes states to 
provide mutual assistance to each other without the authorization of the federal 
government. Although, the federal government does assist in facilitating mutual aid, 
financing, and organization of the EMAC managing body.203 EMAC permits a rapid 
sharing of National Guard forces between all member states. States have shared National 
Guard forces through EMAC during Hurricane Katrina, 9/11 attacks, Super-storm Sandy, 
and in several wildfires.204 EMAC still follows the principles of the Economy Act, 
paying for agency to agency contracting and assistance, in reimbursement from the 
requesting state or from FEMA to the assisting state for the services provided.205  
                                                 
201Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 4,. 
202“National Guard Efficient,”6–8; Crofts, “Shaping The National Guard,”11. The state adjutant 
general serves the state governor as the state’s National Guard military commander when the forces are 
under state control. They are usually appointed except for Vermont and South Carolina, which elect their 
Adjutant Generals. 
203National Emergency Management Compact, “General Topic EMAC Frequently Asked Questions” 
EMAC, accessed on 18 July 2014 from http://www.emacweb.org/index.php/learnaboutemac/module-
positions/general; Bruce R. Lindsay, “The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC): An 
Overview” (Washington, DC: CRS, RL34585, 21 July 2008), 3–6, accessed from 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34585_20080721.pdf. 
204“Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC’s Collaborative Capacity 
Should Improve National Disaster Response” (Washington, DC, GAO, 07–854), 1–3, accessed from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07854.pdf. 
205“ EMAC’s Collaborative Capacity ,” 8–10,; Public Law 104–321, (Washington, DC, GPO, 19 
October 1996), Article IX, accessed 18 July 2014 from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
104publ321/pdf/PLAW-104publ321.pdf. 
 65 
The societal implications of the National Guard assuming the wildfire aviation 
role are positive. The National Guard through doctrine, advertisements, and practice 
communicates that a large focus of their existence is for national emergencies, especially 
natural disasters.206 The National Guard continuously deploys aircraft and ground 
personnel in natural disasters in State Active Duty, Title 32, and Title 10. Since 1973, the 
National Guard has operated three quarters of the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System 
(MAFFS) aircraft under Title 10, State Active Duty, and Title 32. MAFFS have flown 
6700 missions and continue to fly in support of their state and the NIFC through 
provisions of the Stafford Act, MOUs, and the interagency agreement for temporary 
support. In the past decade MAFFS have delivered 9.7 million gallons of retardant and 
flown over 4,561.9 hours in support of wildfires.207 Following the drastic reductions of 
large airtankers since 2000, the MAFFS have become invaluable and make up nearly  
half of the large airtankers available for wildfire management in the United States for 
2013 and into 2014.208 The continued responsibilities of National Guard in wildfire 
aviation combine with the lack of public outcry to support an expanded role in wildfire 
aviation support.  
2. Disadvantages 
The national security implications of a National Guard assumption of the entire 
wildfire aviation enterprise are significant. The wildfire aviation role will require 
dedication of several hundred helicopters, UAVs, large cargo aircraft, and the necessary 
crews and support personnel for extended durations. The increased resource devotion to 
training and deploying on wildfire missions threatens to over commit the limited and 
reducing resources of the National Guard.  
                                                 
206National Guard Regulation 500/5, Air National Guard Instruction 10–208: Emergency 
Employment of Army and Other Resources, National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Support and 
Mission Assurance Operations, (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 18 August 2010), 6, accessed 
from http://www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/pubs/500/ngr500_5_angi10_208.pdf; National Guard, “National 
Guard TV Commercial: ‘Flood’” published 15 May 2012, accessed from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t93PhEt7KIA. 
207“ Review Authorities Military Wildfires,” 1–4; “Forest Service Communication MAFFS,” 3–6.  
208“ Forest Service Communication MAFFS,” 10. The 8 MAFFS C-130s compare against the 1 Very 
Large Airtanker on a CWN contract and 8 additional large airtankers on a contract shared with Canada.  
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As the active duty military services contract in fiscally tight times, the National 
Guard can expect to shoulder a larger burden on operational commitments like it  
had in Afghanistan and Iraq.209 An additional full time commitment of resources for an 
increasingly dangerous and lengthy wildfire threat obligates National Guard resources to 
the incident management effort, but the National Guard will have fewer resources 
available for other national disasters, homeland defense, or national security military 
operations. In the operational reserve role, the National Guard must remain flexible and 
reactive to rapidly deploy forces within their states, inside the homeland, or overseas. The 
additional financial and organizational analysis will help determine the suitability of the 
National Guard option. 
B. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
The financial benefit of the National Guard option resides in the unique dual 
status of federal and state command. As a military organization, the National Guard is 
primarily supplied, trained, equipped, and supported by the federal defense budget and 
the extensive network of defense and industry enterprises. The burden sharing and 
flexible roles of the National Guard permit an alleviation of fiscal constraints of the 
contract-based system for wildfire aviation support, while responsibly controlling costs 
and efficiencies. The National Guard option poses a tangible benefit for efficient and 
effective aviation support.  
1. Advantages 
The National Guard shares the benefits of the active duty military in resources 
and support. Through federal funding, the National Guard has an immense force of some 
350,000 soldiers, 106,000 airmen, in excess of one hundred aircraft squadrons, and  
 
                                                 
209Thomas Shanker and Helene Cooper, “The Pentagon Plans to Shrink Army to Pre-World War II 
Level” (New York City, New York Times, 23 February 2014), accessed from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/us/politics/pentagon-plans-to-shrink-army-to-pre-world-war-ii-
level.html; “Iraq War Drains Guard of Equipment” (Atlanta, GA: Atlanta Journal Constitution, 08 March 
2006), accessed from http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,90278,00.html.  
 67 
several hundred aircraft.210 The economies of scale afforded to bulk defense programs 
and purchases permit a lower cost and more capable assets. The larger pool of aircraft 
and personnel permits more aggressive wildfire suppression efforts then with contracted 
assets. Intended for operational plug and play with active duty forces, National Guard 
units maintain the same high skill level, technical prowess, and incorporated innovations 
as their active duty counterparts. National Guard units employ night flying, NVD aided 
flying, infrared systems, and UAVs in a highly integrated airspace with manned aircraft. 
UAVs of several National Guard units have and currently do, fly missions along the U.S. 
borders employing sophisticated sensors to provide real-time information for homeland 
defense and borer security missions cheaper and for longer durations than manned 
surveillance assets.211 The cost savings and extended performance of UAVs allows 
instantaneous tactical-level dissemination of fire behavior, persistent monitoring, readily 
accessible communications with ground firefighters, and tracking and managing of all 
forces in and around wildfires. Through access to new technologies from industry and 
defense laboratories, National Guard units remain on the cutting edge of safety and 
operational modernization.  
The National Guard option shares the costs and burdens of wildfire aviation 
across several spectrums. The dual status and cost sharing of the National Guard passes 
the costs of purchasing, maintaining, and operating aircraft between the state and federal 
budgets.212 In addition, the capital expenditures for aircraft, equipment, and crews remain 
in the hands of the federal and state; they are not transferred in the actual costs 
reimbursement fees for services from either the state or federal assistance. The Forest 
Service and BLM benefit with reduced suppression costs; vendors include the costs of 
new aircraft and equipment into the contract fees to recoup their expenses and often delay 
                                                 
210“Air National Guard” Global Security.org, last modified 05 July 2011, accessed from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng.htm; “Army National Guard” Global 
Security.org, last modified 05 July 2011, accessed from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng.htm. 
211Tom Barry, “Drones Over the Homeland: How Politics, Money, and Lack of Oversight Have 
Sparked Drone Proliferation, and What We can Do” (Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 
April 2013), 16, accessed from 
http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/IPR_Drones_over_Homeland_Final.pdf. 
212“Iraq War Drains Guard.” 
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purchasing new equipment.213 In the case of the MAFFS, Congress has authorized  
$16 million for two new advanced MAFFS for the National Guard without passing those 
costs onto the NIFC through increased MAFFS rates.214  
National Guard dual status permits either the state or the federal government to 
pay the bills for operating the units. Assets used in State Active Duty or Title 32 for the 
original states retain the costs for wildfire suppression without the need for 
reimbursement. The governors of Wyoming, North Carolina, and California may each 
use their MAFFS in State Active Duty status for wildfire management through rapid state 
command and control without requiring reimbursement by the Department of the Interior 
or Department of Agriculture. Through EMAC, states share their National Guard assets, 
including MAFFS, and reimburse state to state. For Title 10 federalized National Guard 
assets, the federal government pays for the usage of the aircraft internally or requests 
reimbursement to the DOD from the requesting federal agencies according to the 
Economy Act.  
A state based National Guard system allows a state to match the funding methods 
of the only standing state-run forestry and wildfire management aviation force, 
CALFIRE. States can tailor their National Guard use based off their state’s fire risk; low 
states can maintain little to no dedicated wildfire capabilities. The California Department 
of Forestry and Fire Protection (CALFIRE) maintain a fleet of 23 aircraft to support 
nearly year round wildfire operations, with almost a $1.2 billion annual expenditure.215 
CALFIRE budget funding comes in diverse methods from the state general fund, federal 
trust fund, reimbursements, and targeted taxes. All states have access to their own general 
and federal trust funds, but California’s additional methods meet the high demands of a 
fire prone state. California’s Fire Prevention fee targets increased taxes on private 
habitable structures built in the “State’s Responsibility Area” and nets an annual revenue 
                                                 
213“Fire Improvements Needed,” 30–32; “Federal Aerial Firefighting Effectiveness,” 21–23. 
214“ Forest Service Communication MAFFS,” 2.  
215California, “State 2013–14 Budget: 3540 Department of Forestry and Fire Protection” 
(Sacramento, CA: California’s Governor’s Office), accessed on 1 August 2014 from 
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2013–14/pdf/GovernorsBudget/3000/3540.pdf; California Department of 
Forestry and Fire Protection, “Air Program” California State Government, accessed 1 August 2014 from 
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of $64 million in 2013.216 In addition, CALFIRE fights wildfires for other states and  
on federal lands, and these entities reimburse California over $362 million in 2013.217 
The assistance business helps pay for a quarter of the states wildfire costs. Flexibility in 
revenue permits states to account for increased risks in the WUI and facilitate increased 
wildfire resources.  
Increased maintenance and operational costs of the contract-based framework 
have made the National Guard assets even more economical. As noted in the chapter on 
the active duty option, MAFFS actual costs fluctuate annually based on their use and the 
operational costs like aviation fuel. MAFFS efficiencies increase with more use; the 2012 
cost of $13,952 per flight hour at 888 hours flown was cheaper than 2013 at $17,391 per 
flight hour with 540 hours flown.218 The requesting agencies benefit with National Guard 
assets due to avoiding retention fees like exclusive-use and call-when-needed contracts; 
for the National Guard, the agencies reimburse only for the costs of the assets employed. 
The government oversight of actual fees through the Economy Act ensures costs are 
controlled and legitimate.  
2. Disadvantages 
Like the active duty military, the National Guard would face increased attrition 
from the new missions of wildfire aviation. Military planners are cautious and deliberate 
when committing large aviation resources in an increased tempo of flying. Even with 
excellent maintenance, aircraft have a limited life cycle before they require an expensive 
refurbishment or an even more expensive replacement aircraft. The more flight hours, in 
particular with high stress loaded flying of wildfire aviation, the sooner the life cycle 
ends for an aircraft.  
                                                 
216California, “State 2013–14 Budget”; California State Board of Equalization, “Fire Prevention Fee” 
California State Government, accessed on 1 August 2014 from 
http://www.boe.ca.gov/sptaxprog/fire_prev_fee.htm. The Fire Prevention Fee targets habitable structure in 
highly prone areas and tax roughly $150 per habitable structure a year.  
217California, “State 2013–14 Budget.” 
218“ Forest Service Communication MAFFS,” 3–6. The provided hours flown by MAFFS for 2012 
and 2013 were 888.7 and 540.5 at a total cost of $12.4 million and $9.4 million, respectively. The per flight 
hour costs average is $13,952 for 2012 and $17,391 for 2013. 
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The National Guard has a limited budget that requires the appropriations of state 
and federal money. With a shorter life on National Guard aircraft in wildfire duties, the 
costs of new assets and the upkeep of older aircraft increases. The costs are consolidated 
in a shortened period of time in proportion to the aircraft’s effective lifespan. As a result, 
defense and National Guard budgets skew resources toward the needy wildfire supporting 
aviation communities, at the expense of combat supporting aircraft types.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The organizational benefits of National Guard assuming all wildfire aviation 
reside in the dual status and the ease of employing the professional military assets. The 
same professional military culture and bureaucratic support accompanies the National 
Guard as with the active duty military. The National Guard holds several advantages in 
utilizing or bypassing the federal government for either federal or state assistance.  
1. Advantages 
The professionally trained, led, and equipped National Guard maintains the level 
of aggressive risk mitigation as their active duty counterparts. National Guard aviators 
and maintainers utilize the same doctrine and procedures for effective flight operations as 
the active duty military, described in the previous chapter. The culture of learning, 
adapting, and overcoming challenges thrives in the National Guard to ensure the transfer 
of corporate knowledge to new generations of aviators. Scientific analyses of tactics are 
utilized in every facet of National Guard aviation and will increase the effectiveness  
of wildfire suppression methods compared to the contract model of disengaged 
contractors.219 National Guard assets practice like they fight in integrated exercises that 
incorporate all segments of operations; the National Guard will bring the same 
professional preparation and training to the full assumption of wildfire management.220 
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Though a dual status, the National Guard applies advantages and operational 
benefits from both state and federal service. In a federalized Title 10 status, the National 
Guard functions like the active duty military; they are assigned from their various service 
chains of command to NORTHCOM for DSCA in national emergencies or disasters. Per 
the Stafford Act, the federalized National Guard remain under the NORTHCOM 
operational control or are assigned to assist civil authorities or other requesting federal 
agencies, like NIFC and the Department of the Interior. In Title 32 or State Active Duty, 
the National Guard remains under the direct command of their state governor through the 
state Adjutant General; each governor can direct the units as necessary for wildfire 
operations or natural disasters within their own states.221 The state-control method 
permits rapid activation of assets and the flexibility for units to surge in high demand 
wildfire conditions. The EMAC permits the rapid state-to-state sharing of Title 32 or 
State Active Duty status National Guard assets. States can bypass the Stafford Act and 
Posse Comitatus Act restrictions to share National Guard resources to confront 
emergencies or natural disasters, like wildfires. As a result of the confusion during the 
Hurricane Katrina response, changes in regulations allow for a “dual-status” National 
Guard commander to command both Title 32 units and Title 10 active duty military 
forces; this adaptation permits seamless command and control of all forces operating 
within the homeland.222  
2. Disadvantages 
The National Guard organization requires the states to both pool resources and 
individually hoard them. In an infrequent national emergency, states willingly share their 
resources through EMAC or the federal government federalizes various National Guard 
units into Title 10 to assist the afflicted states. Without a persistent need in every state for 
                                                 
221National Guard Regulation Domestic , 7–8; 
222National Guard Regulation Domestic , 7–8; Dan Elliott, “DOD Grooms Commanders for Disaster 
Response” (The Army Times, The Associated Press, 3 July 2011), accessed from 
http://www.armytimes.com/article/20110703/NEWS/107030307/DOD-grooms-commanders-disaster-
response; Katrina Lessons Learned, 43. The Katrina Lessons Learned discussed the problems (waste, de-
confliction, and communication) during the response with command and control of National Guard Title 32 
and SAD forces operating under different chains of command then the Title 10 forces. The resulting dual 
status officers are intended to allow unique federal/state officers to operate with two simultaneous chains of 
command to lead forces of all statuses.  
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their National Guard units to perform intra-state services, the state fails to notice the 
absence of the National Guard forces.  
If wildfires continue to become common hazards for an increasing number of 
traditionally low-threat states, the pool of states willing to share would decrease. National 
Guard units capable of performing wildfire duties would be in such peak demand that at 
risk states would reserve their use to protect that state’s communities before helping the 
communities in other states. A limited commodity with an increased demand would, in 
turn, raise the price for their services.  
D. STATION FIRE 
Had the National Guard option been in place at the time of the Station Fire, the 
combined attributes of the National Guard would have resolved the challenges 
differently. The professional military training and culture of the National Guard would 
have provided a contrast to the dispassionate contract-based assets of the Forest Service. 
With a dedicated mission and responsibility to wildfire management, the National Guard 
would have created advancements in wildfire management tactics, strategies, and 
firefighting resources to bear against the Station Fire.  
1. Advantages 
The National Guard option would have altered the Station Fire results through a 
more effective, aggressive, and efficient aviation model. Like the active duty military, the 
professional standardization of the National Guard would have provided the incident 
commanders with capable resources able to actively, contribute both in physical 
suppression and to the tactical containment strategy. The flexibility of National Guard 
dual status units would have reduced the fiscal oversight on the incident commander and 
fostered the aggressive initial attack the Forest Service and BLM advocate.  
The National Guard option provides a professionally aggressive force that 
corrects the shortcomings of the Station Fire incident management. Based off the 
described National Guard capabilities to fly and fight safely and effectively at night, the 
National Guard option would have altered the Forest Service resistance to night 
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operations.223 The reversal on the night fighting policy would have sustained the 
aggressive helicopter and airtanker suppression and contained the wildfire the first 
night.224 The integrated UAV resources of the National Guard would have provided a 
continuous multi-spectral view of the Station Fire to coordinate containment in the small 
“green island.”225 The advanced situational awareness would have provided sufficient 
warning that the Station Fire had a gap in the fire line barrier on the first night. That gap 
in the barriers permitted the wildfire to cross the highway and expand beyond the initial 
attack containment.226 In addition to their advanced capabilities, the National Guard 
aviators would actively engage with the incident commander and the aviation 
coordinator, as takes place in military operations, to improve tactical progression of the 
mission, unlike the passive contracted crews.227  
Through multiple statuses and payment options, the National Guard assumption 
of wildfire aviation support would have provided more resources without burdening the 
incident commander with cost minimization. Critics charged that the incident 
commanders were overly concerned about containing costs and failed to aggressively 
employ the available resources to sufficiently contain the Station Fire during the initial 
attack.228 The National Guard option helps reduce soaring suppression costs and lower 
                                                 
223Steve Scauzillo, “Decision to Not Use Nighttime Helicopter Water Drops on Williams Fire 
Criticized” (Los Angeles, San Gabriel Valley Tribune, 09 August 2012), accessed from 
http://www.sgvtribune.com/general-news/20120909/decision-to-not-use-nighttime-helicopter-water-drops-
on-williams-fire-criticized. The Forest Service reversed their decision to allow night flying in 2012, but 
only for L.A. County Fire Department aircraft and crews. The change came after significant press and 
political investigations claiming the policies were unwarranted for well trained crews and night capable 
aircraft.  
224“Station Fire,” 27–28. The Forest Service incident manager failed to utilize the available night 
flying capable helicopters for suppression duties during the night due to Forest Service conclusions that, 
“the risks of flying at night outweigh the benefits.” Subsequently, the fire escaped containment in one area 
and spread out of control.  
225“Station Fire,” 14. The “green island” was a one-quarter acre area of unburned fuel that burned 
through the first night allowing expansion across a highway and beyond the containment barriers.  
226“Station Fire,” 14–15.  
227“ Federal Aerial Firefighting Effectiveness,” vii. The contract based system discourages aviator 
input and fails to facilitate the crews as active members in developing the tactical strategies.  
228 “Station Fire,” 37–38; Pringle, “Station Fire Cost-Cutting .” A memorandum from the Forest 
Service regional office advised incident commanders of a budgetary shortfall and to reduce costs by using 
internal forces before using contract, state, or local assets. Incident commanders told the GAO that this 
memo influenced their asset requests and strategies.  
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the inquisition of incident commanders. The MAFFS program already assumes a 
substantial portion of the large airtanker role, at a reduced cost compared to the soaring 
contract costs. 229 The ability of State Active Duty National Guard forces to fight 
wildfires on the state’s budget alleviates fiscal concerns of reimbursements from incident 
commanders who might restrain aggressively necessary strategies.230 States can tailor 
their tax codes and National Guard units to gain revenue to pay for wildfire aviation 
programs, like CALFIRE.231 Utilizing the dual status, the National Guard combines a 
standing force of Title 32 or Title 10 status units with surge capable State Active Duty 
forces. With a fully inclusive compact, the EMAC facilitate state to state sharing of 
National Guard forces for a state financed reserve of wildfire assets for all wildfires. 
National Guard aviation permits capable use of assets through a proactive burden sharing 
of aviation costs between the federal and state governments, who would pay the costs of 
uncontained large fires anyways. As Title 10 National Guard assets fight wildfires for the 
NIFC, governors are incentivized to share the costs of wildfire suppression in their states.  
2. Disadvantages 
The national security piece places a great deal less emphasis on the National 
Guard than on the active duty military. Civilians and politicians expect a homeland 
oriented National Guard. Commitments to wildfire aviation detract some from the 
national security mission and require long-term dedication of resources for one specific 
national security mission. The National Guard will have that many fewer resources able 
to react to the next national disaster, homeland defense mission, or military conflict 
overseas.  
                                                 
229“ Forest Service Communication MAFFS,” 10.  
230 National Cohesive Fire Strategy, 4,. The Department of the Interior and the Department of 
Agriculture endorse that a “safe aggressive initial attack is often the best suppression strategy to keep 
unwanted wildfires small and costs down.” 




The National Guard option remains a highly flexible and robust option to replace 
the contract-based system. With the best of both worlds, the National Guard maintains 
the professionalism and capabilities of the active duty military but without the immediate 
national security sacrifice for DSCA missions. As an operational reserve, the National 
Guard maintains a significant responsibility for homeland defense and national security 
missions; however, the back-up role permits an assumption of other duties without 
risking immediate national security. The American people already expect the National 
Guard to carry out disaster responses, and assuming the entire aviation wildfire mission is 
an extension of existing programs, like MAFFS. The National Guard option is an 
efficient and effective method to bolster the capabilities of wildfire management.  
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V. NEW DHS FIRE GUARD AGENCY OPTION 
A final option is to establish a new United States Fire Guard (USFG) to take over 
all aviation missions of wildfire management. The USFG would follow the U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG) model as an armed service, under the Department of Homeland Security, 
with specific missions and capabilities defined by Congress. With military and civilian 
power, the USFG model described in this chapter capitalizes on the benefits of the DOD 
without the distractions of a national security mission. Working within the DHS, the 
USFG could fulfill DHS commitments to mitigation and response in the wildfire portions 
of all hazards, while retaining an exclusive budget and focus devoted to aviation wildfire 
support.  
The establishment of the USFG would alleviate the burden of aviation wildfire 
support from the DOD and National Guard. With proper funding and resourcing, the 
USFG would take over all of the aviation roles of wildfire management and drastically 
reduce the employment of National Guard and active duty units in wildfire missions. A 
decrease in wildfire distractions would permit the active duty to remain keenly focused 
for national security and homeland defense missions. In the absence of wildfire support 
missions, National Guard forces would be more capable of functioning as an operational 
reserve for the contracting active duty military and to respond the host of other national 
disasters and emergencies. Without the additional wear and fatigue from wildfire 
missions, National Guard and active duty military aircraft maintain longer service lives 
and reduce long range recapitalization costs in the DOD budgets. National Guard and 
active duty units would only remain in a substantially less used reserve.  
This chapter begins by examining the legal and societal implications of the 
establishment of a new USFG service. It next evaluates the fiscal requirements to stand-
up and sustain a USFG; followed by, an organizational analysis of a USFG compared to 
the existing contract-based approach. Finally, the chapter concludes with an application 
of how a USFG would have altered the scenario of the Station Fire.  
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A. LEGAL/SOCIETAL ANALYSIS 
The Department of Homeland Security utilizes doctrine that advocates the five 
mission areas for an all hazards response, but DHS lacks significant capabilities for the 
persistent and growing threat of wildfires.232 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 8 establishes the need for an “all hazards preparedness goal, establishing 
mechanisms for improved delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state and local 
governments.”233 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8 focuses the executive 
departments to focus the national preparedness goal on the five mission areas of prevent, 
protect, mitigate, respond, and recover.234 The National Response Framework defines the 
mission areas and establishes responsibilities.235 FEMA contributes to the prevention and 
recovery portions of all hazards with specific federal grants, rebuilding costs, and relief 
supplies and resources.236 In the category of wildfires, DHS lacks a substantial force to 
influence the mitigation and response mission areas; a new DHS agency dedicated to 
aviation wildfire support provides DHS with that mitigation and response area.  
The brand new U.S. Fire Guard would parallel the legal establishment and 
organizational model of the Coast Guard. Congress enacted and amended several times 
U.S. Code to reflect the changing nature of the Coast Guard from the Revenue Cutter 
Service within the Department of the Treasury to the modern Coast Guard within DHS. 
Title 14 of the U.S. Code specifically establishes the organization, missions, capabilities, 
and many other vital attributes of the Coast Guard. Title 14 USC § 1 establishes the Coast 
                                                 
232National Response Framework, 1. The NRF establishes immediately the five mission areas: 
Preventions, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. 
233The President of the United States, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National 
Preparedness, (Washington, DC, GPO, 17 December 2003), accessed from 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-110HPRT39618/pdf/CPRT-110HPRT39618.pdf. 
234The President of the United States, Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, 
(Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, 30 March 2011), accessed from 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-8.pdf. 
235National Response Framework, 1. 
236U.S. Fire Administration, “Grants & Funding Alternatives” FEMA, last updated 23 April 2014, 
accessed from http://www.usfa.fema.gov/fireservice/grants_funding/; “Oregon Wildfire Receives FEMA 
Funding” (Washington, DC: FEMA, Released Number 13–6, 20 July 2013), accessed form 
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/07/20/oregon-wildfire-receives-fema-funding. FEMA has several 
grants to provide recovery, prevention, and additional firefighting units to local communities. In 2013, 
FEMA used federal funds to pay approximately 75 percent of Oregon’s wildfire firefighting costs.  
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Guard as, “a military service and branch of the armed forces of the United States at all 
times.”237 Title 14 USC § 2 creates the duties of the Coast Guard to enforce federal laws, 
maintain aids to navigation, and “maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized 
service in the Navy in the time of war.”238 Title 14 USC § 3 places the Coast Guard 
within DHS unless the president directs them into the navy through executive order or 
Congress through a declaration of war.239  
If established, Congress would codify the USFG along the Coast Guard model 
with Title 56.240 The USFG would serve as a military service and operate under DHS. In 
contrast to the Coast Guard, the USFG would lack the law enforcement powers, but 
congress would explicitly authorize USFG duties on wildfire management aviation 
missions and reimbursement procedures. In times of war, the president or Congress may 
transfer the USFG to the National Guard, instead of the Coast Guard to the Navy. Like 
the Coast Guard, the USFG would have access to all military schools for instruction, 
“including aviation school.”241 The USFG would supply resources to requesting federal 
agencies or civil authorities for the purpose of wildfire aviation and the conditions of 
reimbursement.242 In addition, the USFG would have access to DOD acquisition officials 
and contract managers for USFG acquisitions.243 
1. Advantages 
As an armed service, several statutory laws would apply to the USFG. The 1878 
Posse Comitatus Act would limit the USFG’s employment in domestic law enforcement; 
                                                 
237Title 14 U.S. Code § 1 - Establishment of Coast Guard, accessed 20 July 2014 from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 
238Title 14 U.S. Code § 2–Primary Duties, accessed 20 July 2014 from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 
239Title 14 U.S. Code § 3–Department in Which the Coast Guard Operates, accessed 20 July 2014 
from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14.  
240Title 56 is the next available title in U.S. code following four proposed titles not yet enacted.  
241Title 14 U.S. Code § 145–Navy Department, accessed 20 July 2014 from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 
242Title 14 U.S. Code § 141–Cooperation With Other Agencies, States, Territories, and Political 
Subdivisions, accessed 20 July 2014 from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 
243Title 14 U.S. Code § 566–Department of Defense Consultation, accessed 20 July 2014 from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 
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however, wildfire aviation support falls short of any standard as law enforcement.244 The 
Stafford Act applies the procedures and limitations of assistance for certain DSCA on the 
USFG in presidential declarations of emergencies, major disasters, and the use 
immediately following incidents that would qualify as either emergencies or major 
disasters.245 The persistent threat and uniqueness of wildfires convinced congress to 
place exceptions for wildfire assistance in the Stafford Act.246  
In addition to the explicit Congressional authorization for wildfire aviation 
support in Title 56, the USFG may participate in wildfire management under Section  
420 of the Stafford Act, 42 USC §5187, authorizing the president to supply resources and 
personnel for wildfire management on public or private lands.247 The Economy Act,  
31 USC §1535, places requirements for reimbursement of actual costs from federal 
agencies and state governments requesting assistance; however Title 56 will explicitly 
eliminate those fees rendered under standard wildfire management duties within the 
United States.248  
In contrast to the clear congressional Title 56 authorization and the statutory law, 
the USFG lacks grounds for wildfire support akin to the Title 10 DOD resources. The 
MOUs and interagency agreements fall short of applying to the USFG while operating in 
Title 56 instead of Title 10, as during a war. The agreements and MOUs are between the 
Title 10 DOD resources and the Department of Agriculture and Department of the 
interior.249 The same applies for the IRA; exclusive to Title 10 forces, the IRA permits 
immediate and temporary assistance from local DOD Title 10 unit commanders with a 
request from civil authorizes.250  
                                                 
244U.S. Congress, Posse Comitatus Act. 
245FEMA, The Stafford Act,2. 
246FEMA, The Stafford Act, 48. 
247FEMA, The Stafford Act; “Review Authorities Military Wildfires,” 3–4. 
248 Manuel and Yeh, “Interagency Contracting,” 2. 
249Interagency Agreement Firefighting, 3–5. The MOUs and interagency agreements fail to apply to 
the USCG operating in Title 14 and state National Guard units operating in Title 32. The same application 
is made to the USFG while in Title 56. 
250Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 4. 
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2. Disadvantages 
The United State public would have a mixed reaction to the creation of the USFG. 
Certain experts still debate the necessity of the DHS, the absorption of so many other 
agencies in 2002, and the focus on terrorism. The political outrage from political 
organizations against any increases to the federal government would focus on the 
increased bureaucracy and federal spending for the USFG.251 Beyond political 
grandstanding, the USFG would raise internal concerns.  
The DHS Office of Inspector General observed that “DHS’s prevention and 
preparedness for terrorism have overshadowed that for natural hazards, both perception 
and application.”252 The USFG would establish the DHS commitment to the all-hazard 
mantra beyond writing checks. The American people recognize the threat wildfires pose 
through seasonal news broadcasts and that someone must actively fight to manage the 
hazards. In the absence of public outrage against the Forest Service and BLM efforts to 
manage incidents of wildfire, the public would present a similar apathy or even positive 
encouragement for the USFG.  
Very little political momentum exists for reform without a major focusing event. 
In a time of fiscal austerity, the federal government has very little patience for an 
expensive, major overhaul of the wildfire aviation system, even if the new option reduces 
long-term costs.
253
 With historically significant wildfire seasons occurring in the past few 
                                                 
251The Libertarian Party, “Introduction” accessed 21 July 2014 from 
http://www.lp.org/introduction/what-is-the-libertarian-party. Libertarians uphold small government and 
decentralized solutions away from the federal government.  
252Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, “A Performance Review of 
FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina” (Washington, DC: DHS, OIG-
06–32, March 2006), 2, accessed from http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_06–32_Mar06.pdf. 
253Stephen Dinan and Tom Howell Jr., “Lots of Talk, Little Action on Debt Deal in Congress” 
(Washington, DC: The Washington Times, 13 October 2013), accessed from 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/13/lots-of-talk-little-action-on-debt-deal-in-
congres/?page=all.The sitting congress has formed little consensus and even less action on vital national 
topics like debt limits, immigration reform, decaying infrastructure, and a host of other major topics. So 
much so the federal government shut down for several weeks waiting to pass the 2014 federal budget. 
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years, the federal government has ceased to perform much overhaul or reform, beyond a 
bandage of several transferred aircraft.
254 
 
B. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS  
The USFG approach creates a new organization with costly startup, but long term 
savings. Unlike the creation of DHS, the majority of the USFG personnel would be new 
hires and not transferred along with an existing agency under DHS. The aircraft would 
require startup funds to buy or transfer existing military or civilian agencies aircraft. 
Fiscally tight, the federal government must see the long term savings of the USFG. 
1. Advantages 
The USFG option would offer a more fiscally responsible option to the contract-
based system now employed for aviation wildfire support. With access to the vast DOD 
resources and expertise, the USFG could maximize the economies of scale for capital 
assets and sustainment of resources. The USFG would represent a public based model 
that employs the advantages of the military and civilian federal agencies in acquisition, 
training, sustaining, and administration. Compared to the contracted system, the USFG 
would save the government money and resources, in the long run.  
The creation of a USFG requires a significant initial capitalization to reach an 
effective level of response. Unlike the 2002 creation of DHS, the USFG would require a 
fully new organization with new resources, personnel, and organization. The federal 
government funding must reflect the stand-up costs to recruit personnel, to acquire assets, 
and to establish an administrative structure. The total initial DHS allocation in 2003 was 
$29.3 billion transferred along with the 22 already established agencies and their several 
                                                 
254Bill Gabbert, “Forest Service to Enlist Help of Coast Guard to Manage C-130 Airtankers” Fire 
Aviation.com, posted 14 January 2014, accessed from http://fireaviation.com/2014/01/14/forest-service-to-
enlist-help-of-coast-guard-to-manage-c-130-airtankers/. The Coast Guard is transferring seven C-130H 
transport planes to the Forest Service, and the Army is transferring 15 small transport planes for 
smokejumpers, as well.  
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tens of thousands of personnel.255 In comparison to the DHS formation, the USFG would 
need a great deal less than DHS, given a smaller end-force size. As completely new 
federal allocations, the USFG initial funds would face more obstacles in Congress. 
Although once established, the USFG funding would replace the costs of contract system 
aviation costs, reported at $2.4 billion between 2007 and 2012.256 
The USFG would have several options to acquire aircraft for the wildfire  
aviation support missions. With congressional authorization and prioritization, the  
USFG could request the transfer of other agency’s unneeded assets, buy new aircraft 
along with other agencies’ orders, or buy newly designed aircraft with the DOD design 
and contracting help.  
First, the USFG could request aircraft through intergovernmental transfers  
of assets. The U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Army are currently transferring seven  
C-130H cargo aircraft and 15 C-23B light cargo aircraft to the Forest Service for wildfire 
suppression and smokejumper duties through this method.257 The aircraft are provided to 
the Forest Service without reimbursement and with a $130 million conversion price tag 
borne by the DOD for wildfire suppression system for the C-130Hs.258 The transfer 
method provides adequate aircraft while avoiding the significant start-up capital for 
purchase of new aircraft.  
 
                                                 
255Department of Homeland Security, “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security” DHS last 
updated 22 October 2012, accessed from http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security; 
Harold C. Relyea, “Homeland Security: Department Organization and Management-Implementation 
Phase” (Washington, DC: CRS, RL31751, 3 January 2005),7–8, accessed from 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31751.pdf. DHS was created in 2002 with the inclusion of 22 different federal 
agencies and their original budgets of about $35.5 billion in requested funds; the final allocation was $29.3 
billion. 
256“Fire Improvments Needed,” 3. 
257U.S. Forest Service “U.S. Forest Service Offers Preview of C-130H Airtankers” U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, accessed 04 May 2014 from http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/aviation/paintscheme.pdf. 
258U.S. Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014: Public Law 113–66, 
(Washington, DC, GPO, December 2013), Sec 1098, accessed from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
113HPRT86280/pdf/CPRT-113HPRT86280.pdf; Bill Gabbert: “Defense Bill Passes, Clearing Way for C-
130H Transfers to the USFS” posted 20 December 2013 at http://fireaviation.com/2013/12/20/defense-bill-
passes-clearing-way-for-c-130h-transfers-to-the-usfs/. 
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 Second, the USFG could collaborate with the other armed services for joint 
acquisition of brand new aircraft and convert them to wildfire roles. Under 14 U.S. Code 
§ 566, the Coast Guard may join with existing DOD contracts for the purchase of new 
assets, “to obtain the best possible price assets acquired.”259 As an armed service, the 
USFG could join DOD acquisitions programs for new aircraft. From the order of  
the most modern C-130J model aircraft, a new C-130 costs $73 million a copy.260 The 
add-on method provides a bulk purchase cheaper per unit price for the USFG. 
Third, the USFG could use DOD assistance to contract purpose built wildfire 
aircraft. The U.S. Coast Guard employs the 14 U.S. Code § 566 for contracting and 
development assistance with DOD contractors to design and build a tailor-made aircraft 
for specific purposes.261 The USFG may use a similar clause to design and build aircraft 
more capable for wildfire suppression or other missions, than military cargo aircraft. 
Utilizing the technical and acquisitions expertise of the DOD, the USFG could build a 
fleet of wildfire specific aircraft without developing a separate research and development 
apparatus.  
The methods chosen to build the USFG will reflect the maturity of the agency. 
Initially with funds devoted to startup costs, the USFG would avoid major expenditures 
by utilizing the transfer method to populate the initial capabilities. As the service 
solidifies, the USFG would replace or expand the aircraft fleet through partnering with 
existing DOD programs or developing new aircraft programs.  
Following the capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard, the USFG may continue to 
lean upon the DOD for personnel and for training. The provisions of 14 U.S. Code § 145 
order the Secretary of the Navy with or without reimbursement to “receive members of 
the Coast Guard for instruction in any school, including aviation school maintained by 
                                                 
259U.S. Congress, 14 U.S. Code §566 Department of Defense Consultation, accessed 04 May 2014 
from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 
260Heilsler, “C-130 Hercules,” 11. The multi-year order of 79 aircraft costs $5.8 billion, and so the per 
aircraft cots $73million.  
261U.S. Congress, 14 U.S. Code §566 Department of Defense Consultation, accessed 04 May 2014 
from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 
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the Navy.”262 The USFG would follow similar guidance to permit the use of DOD flight 
schools for the training of new aviators. In addition, military aviators may perform an 
inter-service transfer from their DOD service into the USFG to permit increased 
experience in the USFG. Creating a qualified and capable aviator takes time, the USFG 
could compensate for the delay in new aviators by filling openings with inter-service 
transfers until the training pipeline sources reach capacity. A downsizing DOD provides a 
ready pool of experienced professionals able to fly the newly acquired or transferred 
aircraft for the USFG. Through transfers and DOD schools, the USFG could avoid the 
overhead of developing a unique aviation training pipeline and start-up the training 
delays.  
With similar operational expenses, the operational cost of the USFG services 
would be comparable to the MAFFS. Initially with C-130s and other military cargo 
aircraft, training aircraft, UAVs, and helicopters, the USFG would operate the same 
aircraft with some additional wildfire specific modifications. The crew makeup, 
maintenance requirements, and operational demands would parallel each other. The 
separation would occur in the dedicated and continued use of the USFG aircraft. Instead 
of the call-when-needed style of the National Guard MAFFS changing from combat 
cargo to wildfire operations, the USFG would remain focused, deployed, and ready year 
round. The MAFFS costs per flight hour generally illustrate that the more hours flown 
and missions completed the more cost effective the program is per flight hour, as shown 
in Table 1.263  
  
                                                 
262U.S. Congress, 14 U.S. Code §145 Navy Department, accessed 04 May 2014 from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 
263“ Forest Service Communication MAFFS,” 3–6. The provided hours flown by MAFFS for 2011, 
2012 and 2013 were 479.7, 888.7, and 540.5 at a total cost of $9.3million, $12.4 million, and $9.4 million, 





Hours Flown Annual Cost Cost Per Flight 
Hour 
2013 1,400,000 540.5 $9,400,000 $17,391 
2012 2,400,000 888.7 $12,400,000 $13,952 
2011 1,200,000 479.7 $9,300,000 $19,387 
2010 12,000 7.7 $3,400,000 $441,558 
2009 0 0 $3,500,000 $3,500,000 
2008 1,300,000 970.10 $16,100,000 $16,596 
2007 200,000 103.4 $1,800,000 $17,408 
2006 1,500,000 826.6 $9,400,000 $11,371 
Table 1.   MAFFS information provided from the U.S. Forest Service.264 
The costs for USFG suppression and wildfire management missions would come 
from specific congressional budget allocations. The Economy Act guides the 
categorization of the actual costs and places restrictions on interagency contracting; 
however, Title 56, establishing the USFG, would make the service exempt from 
requesting reimbursement made specifically for wildfire management missions within the 
United States. Specific allocations within the USFG annual budget requests would fund 
the aviation wildfire support budget for the year. By separating the wildfire aviation costs 
from other wildfire management costs, the USFG would establish a separate but 
accountable agency to plan, to anticipate, and to supplementary fund for especially 
demanding wildfire seasons. The Forestry Service and BLM could maintain the ground 
suppression costs without added fiscal concerns of aviation costs. To combat soaring 
aviation contract costs, the United States needs a single agency responsible to anticipate 
the demand and manage the cost-effective execution of requests, through a government 
owned and operated framework.  
2. Disadvantages 
During fiscally difficult periods, the United States would reduce other necessary 
programs to pay for the USFG. Congress would consider the USFG budget within the 
DHS budget and USFG training and research programs against the DOD budget. The 
                                                 
264“ Forest Service Communication MAFFS,” 3–6.  
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resulting increases to both budgets for the USFG may draw comparable reductions in 
vital national security, homeland defense, and homeland security missions.  
Diminishing the fear, the USFG should result in an overall federal budget savings 
with reduced wildfire management costs in the Department of the Interior and the 
Department of Agriculture. The recouped funds could apply to the DOD and DHS 
budgets to offset the increased financial burden sharing for wildfires.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The USFG organizational framework will mirror the Coast Guard model. The 
USFG would have organizational advantages stemming from membership in the armed 
services with access to DOD training and operational culture. With bureaucratic authority 
from DHS, the USFG could contribute to the incident management planning and tactics, 
instead of passive participation. The explicit construction of the USFG in Title 56 would 
permit seamless contributions to federal, state, local, and tribal authorities to facilitate 
existing wildfire management strategies.  
1. Advantages 
The armed services would provide the USFG with distinct benefits to the 
contracted system. The USFG would have the cultural and bureaucratic benefits of the 
armed forces. The use of DOD schools for training new aviators culturally would 
establish the same methods and thought processes utilized by the active duty military.265 
Internal DOD training pipelines and operational inspections would ensure that the USFG 
would maintain the superior standards of performance, safety, and accountability that the 
active duty military forces keep, instead of the individual vendor meeting a insufficient 
FAA and Forest Service/BLM training requirement.266 The USFG would use highly 
                                                 
265 U.S. Congress, 14 U.S. Code §145 Navy Department, accessed 04 May 2014 from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14. 14 USC §145 gives the Coast Guard access to DOD schools 
and provides a cultural link between similar units within the Navy and the Coast Guard, like aviation and 
maritime vessels. The USFD will continue this concept.  
266“ Federal Aerial Firefighting Effectiveness,” 23; National Interagency Fire Center, 2014 National 




aggressive tactics, like night flying and UAV incorporation, within the risk mitigation 
methods of the military. From the DOD shared culture, the USFG would utilize 
empowered aviators able to intelligently adapt and overcome challenges through 
analytical application to wildfire problems, instead of slaved devotion to traditional 
methods. The uniform nature and professionalism of the USFG would allow incident 
commanders a known quantity of performance in wildfire aviation. 
Organized within the DHS, the USFG could employ statutory authorities and 
proactive methods dissimilar to active duty and National Guard units. Like the Coast 
Guard Title 14, the USFG Title 56 would permit an explicit use of unique service 
methods authorized by Congress; Title 56 would authorize the USFG to maintain liaisons 
and active operational partnerships within the NIFC and the NRF/NIMS structures. The 
DHS authority would allow the USFG to take a dynamic part in and authority of the 
NRF/NIMS, for wildfires in particular. Unlike military forces limited in participation 
until requested, the USFG could permanently fill the ground-based aviation dispatcher, 
supervisor, and manager positions in the NRF/ NIMS to permit direct communication and 
closer planning with the incident commanders.267  
At the NIFC and GACCs, a permanent aviation coordination staff would facilitate 
USFG assignments to dispatch and fulfill aviation requests. In contrast to vendors or 
military assistance providing al-a-carte resources without active roles in planning, the 
USFG would maintain a substantial organizational framework for active participation in a 
reduced bureaucracy of national committees and boards. Within the wildfire aviation 
management organizations, the USFG would replace the fragmented Forest Service and 
BLM aviation boards and would have a permanent seat within the National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group (NWCG).268 The forward leaning authority of the USFG would 
                                                 
267National Incident Management System, DHS, December 2008, Appendix B 101–102, accessed 
from https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_AppendixB.pdf. 
268National Interagency Fire Center, 2014 National Aviation Plan, 2–1; National Interagency Fire 
Center, Interagency Standards Fire Aviation, 02–1. The NWCG coordinate the different interests of 
wildfire management from the various land management agencies in conjunction with close -to a dozen 
multi-departmental aviation boards, committees, and sub-committees.  
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allow the DHS to meet the mitigation and response to wildfires within the all hazards 
mandate.  
In peacetime, the USFG would work directly with the NIFC and the NRF/NIMS. 
The close relationship and inclusion of the USFG into the wildfire organizations would 
permit a reduction in bureaucratic wastes and an increase in accountability. Working 
within the existing structures of the NIFC and the NRF/NIMS, the USFG could develop 
rapid response and anticipatory operations to wildfire aviation demands. The reduced 
bureaucratic glut of Forest Service, BLM, and interagency aviation committees and sub-
committees would leave a single organization more responsive and accountable to the 
end-customers at the federal, state, and local levels.269 As a stand-alone agency and an 
armed service, the USFG could increase efficiencies and advancements to wildfire 
aviation though shortened communication channels, specific effectiveness studies and 
deliberate innovation initiatives with the defense industry.  
The USFG could improve upon the existing aviation capabilities. The immense 
research and development resources of the armed services create revolutions in military 
science continuously, but they rarely revolutionize homeland security missions, like 
wildfires. The national security and homeland defense missions compel the military and 
National Guard to develop capabilities able to best meet these challenges; the few 
capabilities also able to assist in wildfire management, like cargo aircraft, UAVs, and 
utility helicopters, represent a small portion of the overall military resources. In contrast 
to the active duty military and National Guard, the USFG could focus capital and 
programs toward wildfire management needs. Purpose-built aircraft, sensors, equipment, 
and capabilities for wildfire aviation could alter the battle for wildfire management 
beyond a conventional numbers comparison.  
 
                                                 
269 “Federal Aerial Firefighting Effectiveness,” v. The contract based system has created a system of 
committees to run govern and control the contracts and interagency agreements. These leadership councils, 
“respect the mandates of the partner organizations, but do not resolve basic aerial firefighting 
organizational and accountability issues.” 
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2. Disadvantages 
The organizational disadvantages of the USFG would be the wartime 
consequences and contributions to the national security and homeland defense missions 
of the DOD. As an armed service, the USFG would maintain a wartime contribution 
when and if drawn into the rest of the military. Devoted exclusively to wildfire aviation, 
the USFG would possess few capabilities that fit into the traditional military planning to 
defend the United States, other than surveillance and suppression of fires ignited during 
combat. In turn, the USFG could create a dependency for aviation units in domestic 
wildfire management that gaps the coverage in wartime. Without any civilian or military 
aviation units able to fill the gap, the United States would experience significantly 
damaging wildfires.  
D. STATION FIRE 
The USFG would drastically alter the Station Fire scenario, as it would have 
provided the operational framework and culture for a more effective firefighting 
organization and adaptive tactics. With an optimized resourcing system and historic risk-
assessment methods, the USFG would apply the wildfire management doctrine of a 
strong initial attack and respond to the initial report of the Station Fire with a significant 
aggressiveness. The increased capabilities and integrated command and control of the 
USFG would have permitted a seamless flow of communications and wildfire strategies 
between the incident commanders and the USFG aviators. The alleviation of wildfire 
aviation costs from the Forest Service budget would have reduced ancillary distractions 
from the incident commander in order to utilize most effective and necessary strategies to 
contain the Station Fire.  
Integrated fully into the planning, training, dispatching, and incident management 
system, the USFG would have sustained aggressive initial attack and situational 
awareness throughout the Station Fire. Purpose built wildfire aircraft and enhanced 
tactics permit the USFG to fight wildfires more effectively and safely permitting access 
to terrain avoided by contracted crews. A USFG air coordinator working beside the 
incident commander provides a USFG advocate and facilitates more rapid 
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communication between the commander and those carrying out the attack, instead of a 
dispassionate aviation supervisor placing orders for random aircraft.270 The unified 
command and control of the USFG from dispatch to the pilots would ensure complete 
coverage of requested assets and improves situational awareness at each stage of order 
fulfillment.271 Enhanced capabilities, like UAVs and night vision devices, would have 
spotted the wildfire spreading during the first night and permitted night flying aircraft to 
safely continue the containment strategy.272  
The fiscal separation of the USFG would insulate the money concerns from the 
incident manager. Through specific congressional allocations and supplemental funds, 
the USFG could maintain aggressive use of their assets without unnecessarily burdening 
managers involved in the attack. The distinctive DHS risk based approach to hazards 
would shape cost effective rationalization for wildfire aviation expenditures of the USFG; 
instead of the costs of mere management and replacement of damaged property, the DHS 
prioritizes preventing economic disruption. Under the DHS, the USFG would focus 
planning and prioritization to protect areas with the most significant economic and human 
risks, like metropolitan areas with historic wildfire threats.273 The USFG would manage 
efficiencies and accountability for waste through non-punitive investigations and applied 
lessons after the season to keep incident commanders focused on the tasks at hand.274 
Employing the DHS matrix of priorities, modest USFG wildfire aviation expenditures 
                                                 
270“Station Fire,” 26–27. Critics question the aggressiveness of the fire aviation supervisor and the 
lack of communications between him and a contacted Martin Mars large airtanker available for a drop, that 
was turned away during the first day.  
271“Station Fire,” 29. The Station Fire experienced improper ordering methods during the first night 
that lead to delays and unaggressive attacks the next morning.  
272“Station Fire,” 27; “Station Fire,” 14–15. The fire spread the first night across an uncontained 
portion called “the green island.” Critics emphasize the Forest Service night flying stance allowed the fire 
to escape containment during the night.  
273National Response Framework, 20. Within the NRF, the DHS recognizes the value of economic 
impacts beyond the replacement costs directly affected by an incident. Mitigation costs in wildfire 
management ensures a reduced economic impact from infrastructure interdictions and lives lost; this 
reinforces aggressive aviation wildfire management and budget acceptance.  
274“Station Fire,” 37. The Station Fire incident commander reportedly experienced significant concern 
about cost savings from a previously received Forest Service memo about budget shortfalls, while fighting 
the Station Fire.  
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would be more easily allocated and justified to Congress and firefighters utilize the most 
effective methods available.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The establishment of the USFG would create an organization that capitalizes on 
the benefits of the military and civilian frameworks. Taking over the aviation wildfire 
responsibilities, the USFG would alleviate the active duty military and National Guard 
from continuously called upon wildfire aviation responsibilities beyond DOD facilities. 
With a minor role in the national security mission, the USFG could follow a Title 56 
mandate to focus on wildfire aviation through improvements to capabilities, strategies, 
and operational frameworks. The federal dollar could go further with the USFG through 
predictable overhead costs and flexible surge capacity that enhance cost efficiencies. 
Through the Coast Guard organizational framework, the USFG would provide military 
culture and capabilities, without more classical national security demands. 
On the other hand, it must be recognized that establishing a new USFG would be 
a significant and costly undertaking. The establishment of the USFG would require a 
significant political and financial start up to create an entirely new agency within DHS. 
Operating in a contentious political climate, Congress would need to muster the political 
capital to pass legislation creating a new multibillion dollar armed service with several 
thousand personnel Usually, for the Congress and the president to muster such massive 
changes they first require an epic focusing event on the scale of Pearl Harbor or the  
9/11 attacks. In the absence of such a culturally devastating focusing wildfire event, the 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research and analysis conducted for this thesis strongly suggest that the 
existing aviation wildfire support system fails to meet contemporary and future hazards to 
the United States. Aviation wildfire support has significant problems, including aircraft 
shortages and financial shortfalls, but the contract-based system is the most pressing.  
One of three options—based on active duty military forces, National Guard forces, or  
a new U.S. Fire Guard service established within DHS—must replace the current 
framework. This chapter compares the three approaches in an effort to determine which 
one best addresses the shortcomings of the contract-based framework for wildfire 
support.  
A. COMPARISON  
The contract-based framework showed several significant faults, including cost, 
culture, and innovation. The rising costs of managing wildfire hazards in climactically 
changing environments congested with urban expansion have out-priced the contract 
model. Aged aircraft reconfigured to fight wildfires with a bare minimum of safety and 
maintenance precautions fail to provide the service required for longer, hotter wildfire 
seasons. The culture of wildfire aircrews that drives them to fulfill their mission in the 
face of great difficulties also, perversely, encourages these skilled firefighters to accept 
unnecessary adversity and risk because the contracted approach has permitted safety and 
maintenance to suffer. The aviation wildfire culture also has obstructed effectiveness 
studies and discouraged constructive analysis of tactics and methods; dogmatic tradition 
leads, instead of reason and evaluation. The contract-based system exacerbated the 
cultural overreliance on tradition by creating barriers between operators and wildfire 
management officials. The contract-based arrangement stifled incentives to develop and 
employ innovations like night-vision devices, UAV surveillance, and a pooled system of 
national assets—all of which could have altered the course of the Station Fire.  
Table 2 illustrates the similarities and differences in the three options as this thesis 
has explained them. The left column is a list of the primary analysis categories discussed 
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in the thesis to measure the effectiveness and appropriateness of each option in the 
columns taking over national aviation wildfire support. Each row draws on the analysis 
made throughout the chapters of the thesis.  
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Table 2.   Option comparison 
B. ANALYSIS 
The political and legal effects of the three options lean in favor of the National 
Guard option, in terms of reduced complexity. The U.S. Fire Guard option would require 
a significant political and legal effort to establish, organize, and institutionalize such an 
agency in the role of aviation wildfire support—and such lengths are likely only in the 
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wake of major focusing events like World War II or the 9/11 attacks. Similarly, the active 
duty military option would demand a moderate shift in the political and legal 
establishment to restructure and reorient mission priorities. The National Guard option 
requires almost no legal or political exertion, as the Nation Guard provides substantial 
portions of the wildfire aviation mission today. To take over the mission and function 
completely, the National Guard would need only increased strategic coordination among 
the states and the federal government. 
The three options parallel each other in the cultural, safety, innovation, and self-
analysis portions of the comparison. Each option brings to bear a professional military 
culture, or at least the foundations of that culture, through training, doctrine, and 
standards. A similar training background, maintenance standards, and quality assurance 
ties the three options together in their expected effects. Comparable access to advanced 
technologies and innovative companies give each option the same opportunities to 
enhance the performance of aviation wildfire support. The three options rely on the 
benefits of military indoctrination and professionalism to sustain a safety culture that 
manages and mitigates risk, instead of the raw acceptance of risk from contract-based 
system.  
1. Active Duty 
The active duty model would employ units capable of dual combat and homeland 
security roles, including wildfire aviation. Through restructuring the military for a 
balanced homeland security mission on par with national security commitments, the 
active duty would equip, train, and sustain designated units of the armed services for 
tasking in domestic, wildfire support missions. USNORTHCOM would coordinate and 
command the active duty military units in conjunction with requests from the NIFC. 
Prepositioning units during the wildfire season would follow existing protocols 
established by the Stafford Act and interagency agreements. Reimbursement to the DOD 
for services would comply with the provisions of the Economy Act. 
The active duty military option retains several advantages. First, the immense  
size and resources of the U.S. military provides a plethora of military aircraft that can 
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more than meet the numbers requirements for the United States wildfire management 
system. Second, the existing assets of the military permit a reduced annual rate to the 
Forest Service and BLM for aviation support compared to the escalating maintenance  
and operational costs of the aged aircraft of the contract-based approach. Third, the 
professional military institution would support the wildfire aviation units with 
maintenance support, excellent aircrew training, and a risk management safety culture 
established from decades of deliberate studies and evaluations.  
The disadvantages of the active duty option outweigh the advantages for taking 
over the wildfire aviation mission. First, the military must place the traditional military 
missions of fighting and winning wars ahead of additional homeland security missions. 
During a time of war, the military can ill afford further distractions without significant 
additional resources. Second, a multitasking split of aircraft and crews would necessarily 
skew the mission balance towards the primary military duties and requirements for 
combat operations. Such a hastened transition from one mission type to another 
contributed to the deadly crash of a C-130 MAFFS aircraft in 2012; the mishap 
demonstrated that crews experience great challenges when changing missions away from 
what they primarily train and equip for.275 Third, the civil-military relations within the 
United States would inflame with an over-militarization of yet another government 
service.  Existing interagency agreements and statutory law may permit the temproary 
use of the military for national emergencies, but a standing homeland security mission on 
the magnitude required for wildfire support, would raise political and social concerns of a 
praetorian state. The active duty must remain focused on fighting and winning the 
nation’s wars; in a fiscally austere wartime environment, the active duty option is out.  
2. U.S. Fire Guard 
The creation of a U.S. Fire Guard would establish the most capable alternative to 
the contracted operational framework; unfortunately, it too is unfeasible in a fiscally tight 
and politically contentious time. An act by Congress would establish and fund the United 
States Fire Guard along the organizational model of the U.S. Coast Guard, an armed 
                                                 
275“Accident Report: C-130H3,” 34. 
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service that operates within the DHS. The USFG assets would receive training, 
maintenance, and operational support from the DOD, but it would remain under the  
DHS authority. The USFG would operate a mixed fleet of helicopters, fixed-wing 
aircraft, and UAVs entirely dedicated to the wildfire support mission. Unfortunately, a 
Congressionally authorized and funded armed service with dedicated resources to fight 
wildfires is currently a fantastic dream.  
The USFG would have distinct advantages compared to the contract-based 
approach and the other options. First, the USFG would have the same military advantages 
of the other two options: professional aviation training and culture, institutionalized 
safety and maintenance, access to defense-industrial research and technologies, and 
aircrews that would participate in improving the methods and process of wildfire 
management. Second, the USFG would allow focused development of aviation assets 
with wholly wildfire purposes, like scooper aircraft and light crop-duster SEATS. Third, 
the USFG would not detract from the military readiness of the United States. Except in 
the time of declared war, the USFG would not steal away necessary military resources or 
personnel to fight wildfires.  
However, the startup costs and political capital required to craft and pass 
legislation for a USFG places such a service well out of the reach at this time. The initial 
resourcing and staffing of the USFG would require billions of dollars and an immense 
annual budget to operate and maintain aircraft and aircrew readiness. In the absence of a 
major focusing wildfire event, the United States fails to recognize the hazards of wildfires 
beyond a seasonal nuisance for the western portion of the nation. Without an outpouring 
of societal pressure and demand for greater wildfire management, the political will to 
craft and pass the necessary legislation exceeds the threshold of risk for any politician, 
especially during a fiscally tight and politically contentious period. 
3. National Guard 
The National Guard option is the most appropriate fit to take over the wildfire 
aviation mission. It is a feasible option with very little political and fiscal capital required 
to implement and sustain within the existing federal and state structures. The civil-
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military understanding in the United States already expects the National Guard to hold a 
significant portion of wildfire management responsibilities; a complete take-over is a 
reasonable progression of this expectation. The military culture advantages of the 
National Guard resolve the problems of the contract-based approach—through 
institutionalized safety and maintenance standards, a professional military flight crew 
actively engaged in improving the methods and processes, and established patterns of 
incorporating innovations and advanced technologies. 
The societal analysis points to the National Guard as the favorite. Congress and 
the executive have enhanced the involvement of the active duty military in domestic 
issues, but the public perception remains skeptical. The American public reacts 
unfavorably to the militarization of basic services like law enforcement, but the National 
Guard has some signal differences when compared to the active duty military. With 
express exception to law enforcement restrictions of Posse Comitatus and the dedicated 
charge for response to national emergencies, the National Guard is expected to have an 
elevated role in natural disasters, like wildfires. Thus, the American people likely would 
see the takeover of the wildfire aviation mission by the National Guard as a minor 
extension of an existing duty with no new pressures on the civil-military balance. The 
USFG should avoid the praetorian fears as it would be viewed as a unification of the 
fractured system, instead of an expansion of military influence. 
The national security analysis supports the USFG option, with the fewest 
repercussions to the security and defense of the United States. The active duty military 
option places the wildfire aviation mission at least on par with homeland defense and 
national security. In turn, the shrinking military would reduce strategic and operational 
focus on traditional missions, placing the United States in greater risk to deter and defend 
against threats. With inflexible commitments to wildfire management, the National Guard 
option risks increased distractions from the operational reserve and homeland defense 
duties of the National Guard. In contrast, the single-threat focus of the USFG would 
allow resources to be dedicated to wildfire aviation without sacrificing other 
responsibilities. A USFG actually would reduce the diversion of the active duty armed 
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forces and the National Guard from their primary missions by eliminating the need for 
their assistance to fight wildfires.  
The National Guard option is the most suitable of the three to take over wildfire 
aviation from the contract-based system. With little restructuring, capital, or national 
security impact, the National Guard meets the expectations that the United States public 
already perceives as its role in the homeland, and with MAFFS and other assistance, it 
already does. Since the 9/11 attacks and the Global War on Terror, the funding and 
reshaping of the National Guard has molded it into a more capable force able to meet the 
demands of homeland security and defense missions.  
The National Guard option would allow the most flexibility to respond without 
impacting other national level concerns. The dual state and federal roles of the National 
Guard allow for states that understand their wildfire hazards to advocate for federal 
assistance and contribute state funds to bolster their National Guard aviation units. As the 
most threatened states increase their aviation assets, other less threatened states can 
benefit from the increased capabilities through state to state National Guard sharing 
agreements, like EMAC. National security and defense benefits as the active duty 
military can focus on traditional military missions free from additional distractions of 
periodic drains on resources and manpower for wildfire support.  
In addition, the command and control of the National Guard units by the state  
and integrated into the DOD permits a flexible response for either the state governors  
or the president to utilize the assets, without creating entirely new organizations. The 
Title 32 and State Active Duty status permit the state governors to rapidly utilize the 
combined national resources of the National Guard to protect their states, without the 
need for federal action. The Title 10 federalized status and interagency agreements 
between the DOD and wildfire management agencies permits the federal government  
to share the burden of wildfires with the states and to protect federal lands. The 
reimbursement for both state sharing and federal interagency sharing follows the 
provisions of the Economy Act. The existing cost model for the MAFFS illustrates  
a more cost-effective and predictable solution, compared to the contract-based approach. 
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Comparably, the effort and resources needed to develop and sustain the National 
Guard option are easier to stomach by law makers and tax payers. Indeed, the 
responsibilities turn over can occur almost immediately after a few more MAFFS and 
helicopter buckets are acquired and crews trained.  Under existing limitations, the 
National Guard alternative is the most practical solution for the United States.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Wildfire incident management officials and wildfire aviation experts should plan 
for a two-year turnover of duties with the National Guard. A methodic turnover allows 
the wildfire incident managers to rely on the existing level of support until the National 
Guard units have achieved a certain level of proficiency. Experienced leaders in the field 
would train National Guard units about existing methods and procedures; first with the 
units most likely to respond in the high risk states and then to other participating states. In 
time, the National Guard units will own and develop their own standardized methods for 
wildfire aviation missions. A seamless transition to the National Guard would avoid gaps 
in wildfire aviation coverage and unnecessary risks due to haste.  
The National Guard should start the procurement process of new aviation assets to 
augment the existing National Guard forces in wildfire aviation. The wildfire incident 
commanders rave about the existing performance contributions of SEATs, scoopers, and 
light helicopters, many of which fail to have comparable aircraft types flown by the 
National Guard.276 A new military aircraft able to perform similar tasks as these aircraft 
allow a similar tactical choice of incident commanders. On some fires, using a larger 
aircraft like a C-130 is wasteful compared to a low-cost, rapid cycle light aircraft. 
Incorporating UAVs and other military advancements into some of these roles reduces 
risks and costs, while increasing asset availability.  
 
                                                 
276“Fire Improvements Needed,” 35; “Firefighting Aircraft,” 10-11; Keating et al., “Air Attack 
Against Wildfires,” xviii. 
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D. ADDITIONAL STUDY  
Wildfire incident management in the United States requires an aviation 
effectiveness study that focuses on all aircraft missions. Past analyses by RAND, AVID, 
the GAO, and others suffer from gaps in empirical data for the effective use of all types 
of aircraft involved in wildfire aviation.277 In the absence of this evidence, incident 
commanders and industry officials have relied on historical assumptions for force 
composition and procedures.  
A study by both the wildfire crews and incident managers must focus on the 
impact certain practices and aircraft types have on the fighting of wildfires. First and 
foremost, the wildfire enterprise needs evidence of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
each type of aircraft operating in the suppression role in a mix of environments. 
Similarly, each mission set requires an objective analysis to evaluate gaps and 
unnecessary redundancies. Armed with the facts, the aviation leadership can develop 
more thorough doctrine governing aircraft tactics and procedures based on calculated 
analysis, instead of unproven traditions. Learning what works and does not can allow 
specific long-term acquisitions to size and shape the air fleet correctly. A professional 
analysis can convince lawmakers to greater support and fund better equipment, facilities, 
and training for wildfire aviation in general.  
Additional work must study the most effective mix of aircraft. Several studies 
from RAND, AVID, and others have concluded certain levels of large airtankers required 
to meet the current level of demand; however, little study has focused sufficient effort on 
the total composition of additional aircraft.  
In certain geographic regions some aircraft types have advantages over others. 
Large airtankers carry more retardant, but small airtankers and helicopters have quicker 
turnaround aided by many small runways and forward helicopter bases. Scooper aircraft 
require an open body of water to fill from, while large and very large airtankers need 
major established runways that take them well away from most wildfire areas. Any future 
                                                 
277Keating et al., “Air Attack Against Wildfires,” xvii-xviii; “Firefighting Aircraft,” 6; “Fire 
Improvements Needed,” 37. 
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composition study must incorporate UAVs into the balance, as well as how to encourage 
greater implementation of UAVs into traditional and innovative mission sets.   
The existing operational framework of aviation support for wildfire management 
is fatally flawed. There are many problems, including a lack of resources, inflexible 
organizations, and a firefighting culture that too often stifles study and innovation. But 
one of the most critical problems stems from the over-reliance on contracted aviation 
support, in particular with the U.S. Forest Service. The United States could save lives, 
protect land, and better preserve homeland security if this contract support system was 
replaced by a model organized around the National Guard. With little to no additional 
political or legal changes, the National Guard can take over the wildfire aviation mission 
and meet the American public’s existing perceptions of National Guard involvement in 
natural disasters. The National Guard already contributes significant resources to the 
broken wildfire aviation system and a take over the mission would only result a minor 
impact to other national emergencies and national security missions.  
With an existing force structure in every state and territory and improved 
operational relationships with civil and federal authorities, the National Guard is the most 
practical choice to replace the faulty wildfire aviation system. The National Guard has the 
professional military culture and homeland security oriented mentality to provide both 
state governors and the federal government better results per tax dollar spent. The best 
hope for the United States to counter the rising hazards of wildfires is to entrust the 
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